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On May 2, 2019, the Trump Administration made the historic decision
to lift the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act for the first time
since its enactment in 1996. Title III allows US nationals whose property
was confiscated by the Cuban government to sue entities and individuals
who now “traffic” in that property. Legal scholars believed this activation
would trigger an avalanche of lawsuits; however, after two years of the
law’s operation, only forty-some suits were filed, many by the same plaintiffs. Even more surprising is that instead of exposing foreign corporations
that derive substantial benefits from the expropriated properties to liability,
Title III is largely being used to target American businesses that have attenuated connections to the properties, at best. This Article explores the
surprising trends born from the parties’ filings and the opinions issued by
federal courts in leading Title III cases, and argues that the statute’s violation of international legal norms, failure to secure compensation for US
claimants, and unforeseen targeting of domestic companies is ample rationale for the newly elected Biden Administration to urge Congress to repeal the Helms-Burton Act, which has gained the reputation of being one of
the most ill-advised foreign policies of the US for a quarter century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly four decades after the Cuban Revolution, the United States’
strained relationship with its communist neighbor situated a mere ninety
miles from the State of Florida culminated in the passage of the HelmsBurton Act, formally known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996.1 The purpose of the Act was to reinforce and
strengthen the US economic embargo against Cuba established in the early
1960s in order to weaken and eventually uproot the Castro regime in favor
of democracy. The international community has vigorously criticized the
Helms-Burton Act, as Title III of the Act seeks to punish individuals and
entities who engage with property once owned by US nationals and later
expropriated by the Cuban government. 2 The uncompensated taking of
property remains a major point of contention between the United States and
Cuba, even now as relations have begun to thaw; however, Title III, which
violates international law, has done little to secure compensation for victims
and has merely angered the United States’ closest allies and trading partners.
Due to a special “suspension authority” written into the law, Title III
had laid dormant since its passage;3 however, in May 2019, the Trump Administration made the historic decision to activate the civil remedy provision and give claimants the right to sue “traffickers” in US district courts. 4
Given the United States’ inability to negotiate a formal settlement with Cuba over the last six decades, it is no surprise that US firms and citizens
seeking redress for the uncompensated expropriation of their property are
taking advantage of this statutory cause of action. The preliminary findings
from these lawsuits, however, are surprising. As a number of key lawsuits
develop, one thing has become clear: The Helms-Burton Act is backfiring.
Instead of exposing foreign-owned businesses that derive large benefits
from the expropriated properties to liability, Title III is being used to target
American companies that have attenuated connections to the properties, at
best. This unforeseen effect has revealed that Title III is not grounded in
sound legal doctrine or judicious foreign policy. The statute’s violation of
1. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996). Throughout this Article, I interchangeably use
the terms “the Helms-Burton Act,” “the Act,” and “the Libertad Act” to refer to the same
statute. The Act codifies the Cuban embargo, and it cannot be lifted until Cuba has a democratically elected government, among other things. Id.
2. Id. § 6082. The Act labels a host of activities involving these properties as “trafficking.” Id. § 6023(13)(A).
3. 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b).
4. See infra Section II.B.
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international legal norms along with its clear ineffectiveness is ample rationale for the newly elected Biden Administration to urge Congress to repeal the Act, which has gained the reputation of being one of the most illadvised policies of the United States for a quarter century. 5
I begin Section II of this Article with a summary of the relations between the United States and Cuba since 1959, with an emphasis on the expropriations following Fidel Castro’s rise and the subsequent foreign investments in the Cuban economy. I then provide a description of the
Helms-Burton Act. In Section III, I address the legality of the Act and of
Cuba’s expropriations—two distinct issues. I propose that the HelmsBurton Act is inconsistent with international law for reasons relating to the
effective conveyance of title, national sovereignty, and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Finally, in Section IV, I review fourteen of the approximately twenty-five Title III lawsuits filed from May 2019 to May 2020—the first year
of Title III’s activation.6 I follow the developments of these key cases
through January 7, 2022, and I conclude with an analysis of the trends born
from the parties’ pleadings and the court rulings issued in these lawsuits.
II. THE ROAD TO THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
A.

US RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Cuba, not unlike the rest of Latin America, has experienced several
rounds of regime change over the past few centuries. From the 1820s until
the 1870s, individual power-holders, or caudillos, dominated the political
landscape.7 This regime was gradually substituted by oligarchies—small
groups at the top of society that ruled from the 1870s to the 1940s.8 The
1940s to the early 1960s exhibited a more “proto-democratic” character
with the institution of populist governments. 9 The populists, however, were
soon unable to contain popular unrest, and armed forces began to remove

5. US Senators have already proposed a bill titled the “United States-Cuba Trade
Act of 2021” to repeal the Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban embargo more broadly. Jennifer
Doherty, Senators Relaunch Bid to End the Cuba Trade Embargo, L. 360 (Feb. 5, 2021,
10:47 PM), https://www.crowell.com/files/20210205-Senators-Relaunch-Bid-To-End-TheCuba-Trade-Embargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCB7-RT38]. As of this writing, the bill remains in the Senate Finance Committee and has not been recommended to the floor.
6. See infra Appendix for a list of Title III lawsuits filed during the first two years
of Title III’s activation—May 2019 to May 2021. Updates to the outcomes are current
through January 7, 2022.
7. ROBERT H. HOLDEN & RINA VILLARS, CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA 44
(2013).
8. Id. at 45.
9. Id.
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them from office. 10 The armed forces were then challenged by guerrilla
armies like that of Fidel Castro.11 Guerrilla leaders were guided by Marxist
ideology and aimed to undermine the legitimacy of the state and inspire
popular insurrections, which propelled them into power. 12 Remarkably,
Cuba has remained the only Latin American nation to maintain its Communist Party–led state socialism following the collapse of the Soviet Union.13
The 1959 revolt against US-backed authoritarian ruler Fulgencio Batista ended with Fidel Castro’s capture of power, which he successfully
maintained until 2006 when he resigned from the presidency. 14 During that
time, Castro’s success emboldened and inspired other Latin American nations to rid themselves of capitalism, dictatorship, and imperialism—a dangerous precedent in the eyes of the United States. Castro’s incredible influence15 along with his social programs and reforms turned Cuba into one of
the United States’ fiercest enemies with marked hostilities between the two
nations.16
Once Castro took power, his government seized, without providing
compensation, privately owned sugar plantations and other agricultural
estates, converting them into state-owned farms. 17 Castro also ordered the
expropriation of private residences, commercial enterprises, and other
lands, including property owned by foreign citizens and entities. 18
In response to the confiscations, the United States broke off diplomatic
relations with Cuba and passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which
permitted President John F. Kennedy to impose an economic embargo
against Cuba.19 The United States implemented subsequent measures to
attack all possible transactions and activities that benefited the Cuban econ10. Id. at 46.
11. Id.
12. HOLDEN & VILLARS, supra note 7, at 46.
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 50.
15. Holden and Villars describe Castro as “without a doubt the single most influential Latin American of the twentieth century” and “the region’s chief spokesman for radical
social change and violent revolution.” Id. at 50.
16. Id. at 56.
17. HOLDEN & VILLARS, supra note 7, at 54; see also Jose A. Ortiz, Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical and Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey
of Restitution Schemes for a Post-Socialist Cuba, 22 LOY. L.A. INT ’L & COMP. L. REV. 321,
322 (2000); RICHARD E. FEINBERG, THE BROOKINGS INST., RECONCILING U.S. PROPERTY
CLAIMS IN CUBA: TRANSFORMING TRAUMA INTO OPPORTUNITY 6 (2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claimsin-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKK8-GD6J].
18. HOLDEN & VILLARS, supra note 7, at 54.
19. Anthony M. Solis, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 709, 712-13 (1997).
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omy. 20 Despite the US embargo, Cuba’s close ties with the Soviet Union
guaranteed the island economic, military, and political support. However,
the loss of Soviet trade and subsidies after the Soviet Union’s collapse devastated the Cuban economy. Almost immediately, Cuba lost roughly
85 percent of its foreign trade, and its gross domestic product fell by a third
between 1989 and 1993.21
Castro then instituted some “minor, and carefully regulated, marketoriented reforms—including the expansion of opportunities for much needed foreign investment.”22 Castro eased the restrictions that forbid foreign
ownership of Cuban land and enacted legislation allowing foreign investments in the form of joint ventures.23 His economic liberalization reforms
also allowed for some forms of self-employment, private farming, and the
legalized use of US currency by Cuban citizens. 24 Foreign firms from Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (major US trading partners) began
investing in Cuba, and by 1994, the Cuban government had signed deals for
185 joint ventures in petroleum, mining, agriculture, biotechnology, and
tourism.25
In many ways, the Helms-Burton Act was a direct response to Cuba’s
foreign investment programs, as “the Act specifically intends to chill foreign investors from providing . . . the cash that [Cuba] desperately needs.” 26
Initially, Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) introduced the bill on February
14, 1995.27 It passed both houses of Congress and moved through a conference committee by December 14, 1995, with overwhelming Republican
20. Id. In 1962, “Congress broadened the embargo through the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, which restricted Cuba’s assets in the United States and prohibited U.S.
citizens or corporations from conducting any commercial transactions with Cuba.” Id. A
subsequent measure was the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992, or the “Torricelli
Law,” which prohibited (1) foreign-based subsidiaries of US companies from trading with
Cuba, (2) travel to Cuba by US citizens, and (3) family remittances to Cuba. Helms-Burton
Act: Resurrecting the Iron Curtain, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS. (June 10, 2011),
http://www.coha.org/helms-burton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-curtain/
[https://perma.cc/23EQ-UNWM]. The Trading with the Enemy Act, which currently applies
only to Cuba, also makes up the framework of embargo regulations. See Dianne E. Rennack
& Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of
Relations, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (May 4, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43888.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8T7-JWFV].
21. COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS., supra note 20.
22. HOLDEN & VILLARS, supra note 7, at 57.
23. Jeffrey Dunning, The Helms-Burton Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction for
United States Policy Toward Cuba, 54 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 213, 220-21 (1998).
24. Id.
25. Id.; Shari-Ellen Bourque, The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current
International System, 13 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 191, 196, 202-03 (1995).
26. Solis, supra note 19, at 716.
27. Dunning, supra note 23, at 222.
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support.28 President Bill Clinton, however, was hesitant to sign the bill. 29
Then, in 1996, the Cuban air force shot down two American planes operated by a Miami-based Cuban exile group, killing the four activists in the
incident.30 Public outrage and the upcoming presidential election strongly
influenced President Clinton’s decision to sign the Helms-Burton Act on
March 12, 1996.31
The US sanctions regime against Cuba is meant to coerce the last
communist nation in the Western Hemisphere into democracy; however,
neither the embargo nor the Helms-Burton Act has been effective in bringing political change to Cuba. Rather, these policies have merely aggravated
tensions between the two neighbors, damaged the United States’ reputation
in the international community, and caused substantial economic harm to
Cuba and even the United States. The United Nations has estimated that the
trade restrictions have cost Cuba more than $130 billion in economic damages since the embargo’s inception.32 Further, it is estimated that each year,
the United States loses between $126 million and $252 million in agricultural sales.33 The embargo also increases worldwide trade costs, as nations
exporting goods to the United States must certify that their products do not
contain any raw materials originating from Cuba.34
The United States has made some adjustments to its strict policies with
respect to Cuba since the passage of the Libertad Act. In 1999, some restrictions were eased, allowing the US to export certain medical supplies
28. Id. at 222-23.
29. COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS., supra note 20.
30.
Rene Sanchez & Catharine Skipp, Two Exile Planes Shot Down Near Cuba,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
25,
1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/02/25/two-exile-planes-shot-downnear-cuba/f5c76c05-677b-4f55-9a6267873660d992/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5148982440ca [https://perma.cc/KVX2-9AU7].
The activist group, known as “Brothers to the Rescue,” regularly flew in or around Cuban
airspace spotting refugees and dropping leaflets that called for the overthrow of Fidel Castro.
Despite warnings from the Clinton Administration to stay away from Cuban waters, the
group continued its efforts, which Cuba viewed as a direct threat to the stability of its government. Reports suggest that the group’s flight plan did not list Cuba as their destination,
and likely detoured. Id.
31. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996); Solis, supra note 19, at 715. See also HelmsBurton
Act,
PBS
(July
16,
2001,
11:41
AM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/latin_america-july-dec01-helms-burton_07-02
[https://perma.cc/HX36-7D87].
32.
U.S.-Cuba
Relations,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations [https://perma.cc/LKW8-XAEA] (Last
updated Nov. 17, 2021); FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 13 (providing a detailed breakdown of
economic damages claimed by Cuba).
33. COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS., supra note 20.
34. Id.
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and food products to Cuba.35 Relations began to thaw once President
Barack Obama entered the White House in 2008. President Obama fulfilled
his campaign promise to pursue direct diplomacy with Cuba, and his administration loosened restrictions on trade, remittances, and travel. 36 In late
2014, the two governments announced that they would restore full diplomatic ties.37 Embassies were reopened, the United States removed Cuba
from its official list of terrorism sponsors, President Obama repealed the
“wet foot, dry foot” policy,38 and he became the first sitting US President to
visit Cuba since Calvin Coolidge toured the island in 1928.39 The election
of President Donald Trump in 2016 largely reversed these efforts. President
Trump reinstated some of the travel and trade restrictions that had been
eased and maintained that “U.S. sanctions will not be lifted until Cuba frees
all . . . political prisoners, respects freedoms of assembly and expression,
legalizes opposition parties, and schedules free and fair elections.” 40
B.

OVERVIEW OF THE ACT AND TITLE III’S ACTIVATION

The Helms-Burton Act is composed of four titles. Title I of the Act,
labeled “Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro Government,” sets out multiple guidelines related to the economic embargo against
Cuba. More specifically, it prohibits the indirect financing of Cuba, opposes
Cuba’s membership in international financial institutions, withholds foreign
assistance from any state found to be aiding Cuba’s military and intelligence facilities, and conditions reinstitution of family remittances and travel
to Cuba on fundamental economic and political changes.41
Title II is labeled “Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba,” and is
meant to assist the Cuban people in a variety of ways after a transition of
government and a democratically elected government is established. 42
Title III, the most controversial provision, is labeled “Protection of
Property Rights of United States Nationals.”43 Title III creates a private
right of action, allowing US nationals and companies to recover monetary
damages in US district courts for claims stemming from the uncompensated
35. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Passed in 1995, this policy allowed Cubans who reached the US without
authorization to maintain permanent US residence. The repeal brought the treatment of Cuban immigrants in accordance with the US’s policies of other undocumented immigrants. Id.
39. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., supra note 32.
40.
U.S.-Cuba Relations 1959-2021, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-cuba-relations [https://perma.cc/5ADZ-W8V6].
41. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6032-6034, 6036, 6042 (1996).
42. Id. § 6061.
43. Id. §§ 6081-6085.
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expropriation of their property by the Cuban government. 44 These claims
may be brought against any person who “traffics” in such expropriated
property. The Act states that
a person traffics in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally—
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers,
manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated
property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses,
obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from,
trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking
(as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another
person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property. 45
Notably, the Act applies to (1) any US citizen, including Cubans who
were not US nationals at the time of the expropriation, but who subsequently became naturalized American citizens, and (2) any legal entity organized
under US laws with a principal place of business in the United States, including Cuban legal entities that were not organized in the US at the time of
the expropriation but that currently are. 46
Finally, Title IV, “Exclusion of Certain Aliens,” gives the US government the power to deny entry to aliens who either “traffic” in confiscated
property once belonging to US nationals or who are corporate officers or
majority shareholders of corporations that “traffic” in such property. 47 Fur44. Id. § 6082.
45. Id. § 6023(13)(A). The term “knowingly” is further defined in the Act as “with
knowledge or having reason to know.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(9) (1996).
46. Id. § 6023(15).
47. Id. § 6091. Most recently, Spanish CEO Gabriel Escarrer of Meliá Hotels International, S.A. was banned from entering the United States due to the company’s operations
in Cuba. See Spain’s Melia says CEO banned from U.S. over hotels in Cuba, REUTERS (Feb.
5, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-melia-cuba-usa/spains-melia-saysceo-banned-from-u-s-over-hotels-in-cuba-idUSKBN1ZZ2G0
[https://perma.cc/9JFTHU5C].
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ther, these individuals’ spouses, children, and agents are also excludable
from entry under this Title. 48
The passage of the Helms-Burton Act was met with intense criticism
from the international community, particularly with respect to Titles III and
IV, due to their extraterritorial nature and violation of international trade
treaties. Mexico and Canada condemned Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act
as a violation of Chapter 16 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which allows businessmen to travel freely throughout the
NAFTA countries. 49 The two nations also passed retaliatory legislation. 50
The European Union (EU) responded forcefully, stating, “We do not believe it is justifiable or effective for one country to impose its tactics on
others.”51 EU ministers expressed their displeasure not only with the extraterritorial provisions of the Act, but also with the effects that it would have
on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the international trade system, in general.52 The EU’s message was clear—it in no way intended to
comply with the Act, and on November 22, 1996, it unanimously passed a
“blocking statute,” which allows Europeans to bring their own suits to recover any damages assessed in US courts pursuant to Title III of the Act. 53
Importantly, the Helms-Burton Act allows the sitting US President to
suspend the right to sue under Title III for a period of six months if the
President determines “that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.”54 Since the Act was passed, a US President or Secretary of State has
regularly suspended Title III. 55 Even the Trump Administration, which was
perceived as more uncompromising toward Cuba, continued to suspend the
provision in the first two years of its term. 56

48. 22 U.S.C. § 6091.
49. Dunning, supra note 23, at 228-29; PBS, supra note 31.
50. Solis, supra note 19, at 729-32.
51. Id. at 727.
52. Id. The EU brought a challenge to the Act in the WTO because it punishes
foreign companies for conducting business outside US borders, but dropped the case in
1998. PBS, supra note 31.
53. Council Regulation 2271/96, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC).
54. 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b) (1996).
55. Mimi Whitefield, Trump Administration Extends Ban on Lawsuits Over Confiscated Property in Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (June 28, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article214018574.html.
56. July 2018 was the last time the Trump Administration suspended Title III. Id.

2021]

THE HELMS-BURTON ACT BACKFIRES

11

The Administration, however, began to review this policy following
mounting protests and political tensions in Venezuela and Nicaragua.57 Accordingly, on January 16, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that the Trump Administration would be suspending Title III for
only forty-five days, instead of the typical six-month period permitted under
the Act. The goal was to permit the Administration to
conduct a careful review of the right to bring action
under Title III in light of the national interests of
the United States and efforts to expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba and include factors such
as the Cuban regime’s brutal oppression of human
rights and fundamental freedoms and its indefensible support for increasingly authoritarian and corrupt regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua.58
In March 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo reported his determination
to suspend Title III for an additional thirty days through April 17, 2019,
while continuing “to study the impact of [the] suspension on the human
rights situation in Cuba.”59 This suspension was limited, and starting March
19, 2019, American citizens and companies could bring suits in US federal
courts against entities and sub-entities identified on the “Cuba Restricted
List”—a Department of State compilation of Cuban entities that the US
government considers to be “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf
of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services personnel.” 60 On
April 2, 2019, Secretary Pompeo announced that this partial lifting would
be extended for another two weeks through May 1, 2019.61 Then, on April
17, 2019, President Trump fully lifted the long-standing limitation on
57. See Moises Rendon & Mia Kazman, Lessons from Venezuela for Nicaragua,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessonsvenezuela-nicaragua [https://perma.cc/U4QU-T2JK].
58. U.S. Dep’t of State, Media Note, Secretary’s Determination of 45-Day Suspension Under Title III of LIBERTAD Act (Jan. 16, 2019), https://20172021.state.gov/secretarys-determination-of-45-day-suspension-under-title-iii-of-libertadact/index.html [https://perma.cc/L6WM-KWX4].
59. U.S. Embassy Havana, Secretary Enacts 30-Day Suspension of Title III
(LIBERTAD Act) With an Exception, U.S. EMBASSY IN CUBA (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://cu.usembassy.gov/secretary-enacts-30-day-suspension-of-title-iii-libertad-act-withan-exception/ [https://perma.cc/UG8X-AKWQ].
60. The State Department’s List of Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba,
82 Fed. Reg 52090 (Nov. 9, 2017).
61. U.S. Dep’t of State, Media Note, Secretary Pompeo Extends for Two Weeks
Title III Suspension with an Exception (LIBERTAD Act) (Apr. 3, 2019), https://20172021.state.gov/secretary-pompeo-extends-for-two-weeks-title-iii-suspension-with-anexception-libertad-act/index.html [https://perma.cc/6APM-MX8J].
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American citizens seeking to file lawsuits against persons and entities that
“traffic” in property confiscated by the Cuban regime. 62 Consequently, Title
III became effective on May 2, 2019, for the first time since the Act’s passage in 1996, and Secretary Pompeo warned: “Those doing business in Cuba should fully investigate whether they are connected to property stolen in
service of a failed communist experiment.”63
Even with the historically consistent suspension of Title III, the Libertad Act negatively impacted the Cuban economy. Foreign investors were
always cognizant of the risks involved with pursuing business in Cuba, especially those that have property or subsidiaries in the United States. 64 The
activation of Title III has cast further doubt upon the validity of property
titles, capable of causing discouragement of foreign investment, privatization, as well as economic recovery and diversification in Cuba. Section III
of this Article explores the issue of effective transfer of property titles under
international law and US real property law along with the Act’s various
violations of international legal norms.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO TITLE III
The legality of Cuba’s expropriation of land is a distinct analysis from
the legality of the Helms-Burton Act, which focuses on the extent of national jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act. While certain expropriations
by the Cuban government may be considered to be illegal under international law, that does not mean that it is lawful for the United States to extend its jurisdiction to adjudicate acts that wholly take place within Cuba.
The Act is inconsistent with international law for several reasons. First,
Title III attacks the rights of third parties, who arguably have valid title to
the property, as supported by real property law principles and the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Second, Title III exercises
extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond any internationally recognized basis for
62. The White House, President Donald J. Trump Is Taking a Stand for Democracy
and
Human
Rights
in
the
Western
Hemisphere
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-takingstand-democracy-human-rights-western-hemisphere/ [https://perma.cc/H73J-B4UK].
63. Francesca Paris, Trump Administration Announces Measures Against Cuba,
Venezuela
and
Nicaragua,
NPR
(Apr.
18,
2019,
8:57
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/18/714552854/trump-administration-announces-measuresagainst-cuba-venezuela-and-nicaragua [https://perma.cc/5XT9-DJMT].
64. Pierre Marc Johnson, The Helms-Burton Act and Its Implications for Canadian
Investors: Where Do We Stand at the Dawn of Warmer Relations Between U.S. and Cuba?
LAVERY
LAWS.
(Oct.
29,
2015),
https://www.lavery.ca/DATA/PUBLICATION/1899_en~v~the-helms-burton-act-and-itsimplications-for-canadian-investors-where-do-we-stand-at-the-dawn-of-warmer-relationsbetween-the-u-s-and-cuba-.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R2C-GX9K].
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jurisdiction, as it concerns transactions between foreign nationals and the
Cuban State involving Cuban territory. Third, Title III’s conferral of retroactive rights upon naturalized Cuban-Americans is an unlawful interference
in Cuba’s domestic affairs and a violation of the nationality of claims principle. Fourth, by declaring the act of state doctrine inapplicable, Title III
forces the judicial branch to exercise the core functions of the legislative
and executive branches. And fifth, Title III essentially acts as a secondary
boycott, which is a violation of both US and international legal principles.
A.

WERE THE CUBAN EXPROPRIATIONS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW?

Cuba’s 1940 Constitution recognized “the existence and legitimacy of
private property in its broadest concept as a social function.”65 Further, Article 24 of the Constitution prohibited confiscation except by a competent
judicial authority, made with prior payment and justified by public utility. 66
After the 1959 revolution, Castro amended Article 24 to allow for discriminatory takings of property from Batista’s supporters.67 The new Cuban government then repealed the Constitution of 1940 and drafted a new constitution in line with its communist goals. 68 The Cuban nationalization process
largely occurred between 1959 and 1968, targeting different categories of
landowners and property during each step. 69
Castro’s government first seized the property of Batista government
officials and alleged counterrevolutionaries.70 These seizures can be labeled
as “confiscations” and diverge from Cuba’s later “expropriations” of property.
[A] confiscation is [a] seizure of private property
by the state without compensation, usually to punish the person whose property is seized for who he
is or for what he has done. Confiscations are ordered for political, religious, legal, or other reasons

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Ortiz, supra note 17, at 326 (citing Article 87 of the 1940 Cuba Constitution).
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 329.
See ROLANDO ANILLO-BADIA, ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON.,
OUTSTANDING CLAIMS TO EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY IN CUBA 84 (2011),
https://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v21-anillo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MZX-K5U2].
70. Id.
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relating to a person subjected to the taking, and not
the property itself.71
In contrast, an expropriation “is the taking by the state, subject to compensation, of a specified property for some public purpose, with the taking being independent of the acts or identity of the owner.” 72
Following these initial confiscations, the Cuban government passed a
series of laws targeting Cuban-owned property more generally as well as
foreign-owned property. The Agrarian Reforms of 1959 and 1963 allowed
the takeover of agricultural estates and cattle ranches. 73 The Urban Reform
Law of October 1960 transferred all rental residential properties to the Cuban State, giving the government the exclusive right to lease residential
properties. 74 In July 1960, the Cuban government passed Law No. 851,
which authorized the expropriation of property and businesses in Cuba belonging to US citizens and stipulated that compensation would be resolved
at a later date.75 With Law No. 890 of 1960, the Cuban government expropriated and nationalized nearly all remaining foreign-owned and Cubanowned businesses and industries.76 Then, the “Revolutionary Offensive” of
1968 sought to end all private business, with the exception of a few smallscale agricultural businesses.77 The last category of takings centered on
abandoned property. Cuba’s passage of Law No. 989 of 1961 essentially
deprived Cubans who had moved abroad of their inheritance and property
rights.78 As a result,
Cubans leaving the country for the United States
[were given] twenty-nine days to return to Cuba;
those traveling elsewhere in the Western hemisphere had sixty days, and those traveling to Europe had ninety days. Failure to return to Cuba
within those time periods was deemed a permanent

71. Id. at 83 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)). Throughout this
Article, I often use the term “confiscated property” because that is the term utilized in the
statute and by plaintiffs and defendants in their pleadings—this word choice is not meant to
suggest that a particular seizure of property by the Cuban Government was ordered to punish
the former property owner.
72. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)).
73. Id. at 83, 85.
74. ANILLO-BADIA, supra note 69, at 85.
75. Ortiz, supra note 17, at 332.
76. Id.
77. ANILLO-BADIA, supra note 69, at 86.
78. Id.
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departure from the country, rendering the person’s
property subject to confiscation.79
The uncompensated expropriation of US-owned property is the root of
much of the antagonism between Cuba and the United States.80 It is widely
recognized that a state has the right to take possession of private property
belonging to both its own citizens and foreign nationals, provided that the
taking is for a legitimate public purpose and that compensation is paid to
the owner.81 Further, if the taking involves foreign-owned capital, it must
be non-discriminatory toward the foreign owners. 82 While the Cuban expropriations arguably served a legitimate state interest since they advanced
Castro’s socialist state, Cuba has not satisfied compensation and must still
resolve these outstanding property claims.
There is a divergence of views in the international legal field regarding
the issue of compensation for expropriated property. 83 That being said, the
Cuban government does not dispute the principle of compensation for the
taking of foreign properties. 84 In fact, Law No. 851 included a compensation mechanism that would provide such compensation “by means of 30year bonds yielding two percent (2%) interest, to be financed from the profits Cuba realized from sales of sugar in the US market in excess of 3 million tons per annum at not less than 5.75 cents per pound.” 85 This indicates
that Cuba acknowledges its legal duty to indemnify American property
owners for the takings. 86 Cuba also “formally reaffirmed its willingness to
discuss claims with the U.S. government” after President Obama initiated
diplomatic relations.87 In 2015, a bilateral commission was charged with
addressing a number of issues, including the nearly six thousand certified
US property claims. 88
79. Id.
80. E.g., Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Resolving U.S. Expropriation Claims Against
Cuba: A Very Modest Proposal, 22 L. & BUS. REV. AMS., 3, 5 (2016).
81. E.g., Lee A. O’Connor, The International Law of Expropriation of ForeignOwned Property: The Compensation Requirement and the Role of the Taking State, 6 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 355, 356 (1983).
82. Id. at 357.
83. See infra Section III.C.
84. FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 10. Cuba has already negotiated bilateral settlements of outstanding property claims with other governments, including Canada (1980),
Great Britain (1978), France (1967), Spain (1967), and Switzerland (1967). These payments
have not been large and typically resemble a “lump sum settlement,” which the receiving
nation then distributes to claimants. Id. at 11-12.
85. ANILLO-BADIA, supra note 69, at 83 n.1.
86. Id.
87. FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 7.
88. Id. at 3. In 1964, the US Congress directed the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) to determine the amounts of valid US claims against Cuba based on
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Scholars recognize that “the expropriation claims by U.S. nationals
and Cuban citizens have separate legal and political bases and may have to
be addressed differently by the Cuban government.” 89 A state’s treatment of
foreign nationals within its territory falls within the scope of international
law, and Cuba will have to grapple with how to properly compensate US
nationals whose property was expropriated. 90 By contrast, the standard by
which a state treats its own citizens is a domestic matter and “international
law principles do not provide a remedy to domestic claimants for the expropriation of their assets by their government. The resolution of the Cuban
nationals’ expropriation claims, therefore, [should] be handled in accordance with Cuban laws.”91
Through the Helms-Burton Act, the United States seeks to blur the line
between these two distinct groups of claimants. The number of US property
claims was not large enough to threaten the Cuban economy, but by allowing Cuban-Americans to avail themselves of the remedies provided by Title
III, the United States sought to ensure the deterrence of foreign economic
activity in Cuba by threat of litigation in US courts—a threat that has now
become reality. 92 Yet, international law suggests that expropriation, whether
followed by immediate compensation or not, effectively transfers title of
the property to the Cuban government and then on to third parties, if any,
indicating that Title III’s legal foundation is fragile.
B. EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF TITLE

While some consider Cuba’s expropriation of US-owned land to be a
breach of international legal obligations, because compensation was never
satisfied and evidence suggests that some of the initial takings were discriminatory,93 the issue in this case boils down to this:
losses resulting from expropriation. Id. at 16-20. See infra Section IV.A., for a detailed
discussion on the FCSC’s Cuban Program.
89. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of
Cuban Nationals’ Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT’ L L. 217, 222-23
(1995); see also Robert L. Muse, A Public International Law Critique of the Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act of 1996), 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 243 (1997).
90. FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 16-20. For possible compensation solutions see id.
at 27-34.
91. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 89, at 223; see also Muse, supra note 89, at 243.
92. Muse, supra note 89, at 223-25.
93. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 80, at 10 n.34.
It has been the conclusion of U.S. courts and legal scholars
that at least some of the expropriations of the assets of U.S. nationals, such as those arising from Law 851 of July 6, 1960,
were contrary to international law on the additional grounds
that they were ordered in retaliation against actions taken by
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When title to the property has been transferred by
the State to a third party, whose title is challenged
by the expropriated owner, the foreign court will
have to pass judgment upon the validity of this
transfer. Will public policy prevent the recognition
of the transfer? There is no unity of opinion on this
matter.94
In 1947, several law professors confronted this question at an international law conference, each taking a different stance. Professor B.A. Wortley, from the University of Manchester, read his paper on “Expropriation in
International Law,” and others commented on it. Wortley stated:
To nationalize without compensation is confiscation; it is not in accordance with international law,
and it is effective only so long as the sovereign
continues in effective possession of the thing taken.
A confiscating sovereign cannot expect his title,
acquired solely by his own law and in contradiction
to international law, to be universally guaranteed,
and indeed it is not. Once the question of sovereign
immunity goes, then a mere declaration by a sovereign will not confer a title.95
Professor Wortley added that while it is accurate to say that the validity of a sovereign’s acts in relation to property within its jurisdiction cannot
be questioned in that nation’s courts, “it is quite another thing to say that
the act of a sovereign in his own country necessarily gives an internationally valid title capable of transfer to third parties, in respect of all property
seized by that State.”96
the United States to eliminate Cuba’s sugar quota, and because
they discriminated against U.S. nationals.

Id.
94. George A. van Hecke, Confiscation, Expropriation and the Conflict of Laws, 4
INT’L L.Q. 345, 356 (1951) (“[T]he effect of confiscatory measures is strictly limited to the
territory of the confiscating State. But once they have been carried into effect within the
jurisdiction, the unconditional recognition of the third party’s title, as applied by the English
and American courts, and the doctrine of jurisdictional immunity both combine to reduce to
a bare minimum the protection which foreign courts can give to dispossessed owners.”). Id.
at 357.
95. B.A. Wortley et al., Expropriation in International Law, 33 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE GROTIUS S OCIETY 25, 33 (1947).
96. Id.
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While some agreed with Wortley’s synopsis of the law, others found
issue with his treatment of transfer of title to third parties. Professor G.C.
Cheshire stated:
To deny the validity of a title acquired by a purchaser from the confiscating Sovereign would be a
dangerous precedent and would be inconsistent
with the general principles that govern the assignment of choses in possession in Private International Law. Moreover, would it not be regarded as
an affront to the foreign Sovereign? Personally, I
would hesitate to agree with the suggestion that if
the expropriation by a State of property within its
jurisdiction is contrary to natural justice, then no
internationally valid title is acquired either by the
State or its successors.97
This notion has been further developed and supported since 1947. Thus,
even if some of the Cuban expropriations were “contrary to international
law for one or more reasons, they were legally effective in transferring title
to the assets to the Cuban state.”98
Indeed, United Nations researchers affirm that “[i]n cases of direct expropriation, there is an open, deliberate and unequivocal intent, as reflected
in a formal law or decree or physical act, to deprive the owner of his or her
property through the transfer of title or outright seizure.”99 As discussed,
the Cuban government passed a series of laws reflecting its intent to nationalize privately owned land, businesses, and industries in Cuba. With this
newly acquired authority, Cuba engaged in direct expropriation resulting in
the transfer of title of the properties benefiting the Cuban State or statemandated third parties. Even assuming that Cuba’s 1940 Constitution was
still in effect, its language “strongly suggests that the Cuban government’s
failure to pay compensation in accordance with the constitutional provision
97. Id. at 37. See also van Hecke, supra note 94, at 356 (“In England it has been
held, with regard to Soviet measures of nationalisation, that title to property situated within
the jurisdiction of the confiscating State has validity and conclusively passed to the State and
that hence the claim brought in England against the third party must fail, even though the
previous owner is a British subject.”) (citing Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (U.K.)).
Germany, Belgium, and Austria have held similarly. Id.
98. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 80, at 10 n.34.
99. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, at 7, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.7 (2011)
(emphasis added). In contrast to direct expropriation, “indirect expropriation involves total
or near-total deprivation of an investment but without a formal transfer of title or outright
seizure.” Id. This well recognized category of expropriation is not at issue here.
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did not render the takings legally ineffective, but instead transferred title of
the properties to the government and gave rise to an obligation to compensate former owners.”100 Article 24 of the Cuban Constitution required compensation of expropriated property, but also made clear that “[f]ailure to
comply with [its] requirements shall give rise to the right by the person
whose property has been expropriated to the protection of the courts and, if
appropriate, to have the property returned to him.” 101 This suggests that
title was meant to remain with the state unless and until a court ruled that
the expropriated property should be returned. A ruling by a Cuban court
that the government’s takings were legally invalid is highly unlikely; however, even if a court were to hold that particular takings were invalid and
require some form of relief, “it is likely that the court would find that the
takings were nonetheless effective in transferring title of the properties to
the state.”102 Of course, this does not signify that the Cuban government is
free of its duty to compensate the injured for the takings; however, that duty
has no bearing on the effective passing of title. 103
This conclusion is arguably supported by US real property jurisprudence as well. While the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation,” 104 the United States Supreme Court
has held that the “Fifth Amendment does not require that just compensation
be paid in advance of or even contemporaneously with the taking.”105 All
that is required is the existence of a “reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.” 106 Thus, Supreme Court precedent
stands for the proposition that property can indeed transfer without the immediate payment of owed compensation.107
100. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 89, at 243.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 244. It is worth noting that even if a designated remedy is restitution, that
remedy is non-self-executing and would require a re-transfer of property rather than a mere
repossession of property to which an owner maintained continuously valid title. This reality
under real property law further supports the view that expropriation is effective in passing
title (and ultimately to its fruits) to the expropriating state, and then on to a third party.
103. Id.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. E.g., Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l
Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)).
106. Id. See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25
(1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kansas R. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)); Sweet v.
Rechel, 195 U.S. 380, 400 (1895); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945) (“It has
long been settled that due process does not require the condemnation of land to be in advance of its occupation by the condemning authority . . . .”).
107. E.g., D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L. J. 1280,
1294-95 (2010).
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Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable conversion recognizes that the
interest in owning property and the interest in being compensated for property owned are distinct and severable. 108 For example, when a property
owner enters a contract to sell land, the buyer acquires the seller’s property
interest, but the seller retains a pecuniary interest in the property—that is,
“[t]he seller’s interest is treated as one in personal property because the
seller’s true interest is in the proceeds.” 109
The rationale underlying equitable conversion can be extended to the
exercise of eminent domain—a property owner whose land is the object of
a state condemnation action has separate and distinct fungible and nonfungible interests in his property. More specifically, “[o]nce the right to take an
individual’s property is established, the owner’s interest becomes an interest in fungible property (money) and the exact amount the government must
pay can be determined after possession transfers.”110 The taking of private
property can be further analyzed by the property rule and liability rule. The
notion that one is protected from being deprived of his private property
implicates the property rule; however, where circumstances demand the
abrogation of this right, the liability rule comes into play, and just compensation must be provided in exchange for property taken for some legitimate
public use. 111 Thus, “[i]f an eminent domain action is executed by a lawfully authorized agent for a public use without paying just compensation initially, the property owner can later be made whole by awarding interest on
the ultimate amount paid by the taking authority.”112
Given these domestic and international legal principles, Congress’s
finding that parties can legally be held liable for their dealings in what are
now Cuban State–owned assets and lands is unsound. Pursuant to its constitution and national laws, Cuba engaged in direct expropriation of land for a
public purpose. These expropriations necessitate compensation but were
nevertheless effective in passing title from the original owners to the Cuban
State. Subsequently, Cuba had the full right to transfer its interest to third
parties. Therefore, any possession, use, or transfer of the property by either
Cuba or a third-party purchaser should not be deemed “trafficking.” Certainly, the passage of time between the expropriations and the compensation poses many issues in determining recompense; however, those issues
can be addressed by granting interest on the ultimate amount awarded when
the final determination of just compensation is made.
108. Id. at 1314.
109. Equitable Conversion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
110. Hudson, supra note 107, at 1314.
111. Id. (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)).
112. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
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C. PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

The argument that title to the Cuban lands was effectively transferred
following the expropriations is further supported by the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This principle was formally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 by resolution 1803
(XVII), which provides that member states and international organizations
will respect the sovereignty of nations over their natural wealth and resources.113 The resolution sets out eight articles concerning the exploration,
development and disposition of natural resources, nationalization and expropriation, economic development, foreign investment, and other related
issues.114 Paragraph 4 of the resolution states:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public
utility, security or the national interest which are
recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such
cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the
State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international
law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be
exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign
States and other parties concerned, settlement of
the dispute should be made through arbitration or
international adjudication.115
The resolution makes clear that a state has the right to nationalize
property belonging to both its own citizens and foreign nationals, subject to
the requirements stipulated by international law. Those requirements are:
(1) the taking must be for a public purpose; (2) it must be nondiscriminatory; and (3) compensation must be paid promptly, adequately,
and effectively. 116 This triple standard has changed over time, and “State
113. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962).
114. Id.
115. Id. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). Paragraph 5 of the resolution further states, “The free
and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural resources
must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality.” Id. ¶ 5.
116. E.g., Fritz Visser, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Nationalization of Foreign Interests, 21 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 76, 80
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practice no longer provides support for the traditional claim that both the
amount of compensation should be assessed and payment be made at the
time of, or even prior to, the act of dispossession.” 117 A number of circumstances are now taken into account when adequacy of compensation is discussed, including: (1) the state’s financial capacity to pay, (2) the length of
exploitation, (3) the contribution the nationalized property made to the economic and social development of the state, and (4) the state’s reinvestment
policies.118 Accordingly, “if a large-scale nationalization program is implemented as a measure of social reform, less stringent compensation requirements should be imposed.”119
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was
subsequently incorporated in Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States (CERDS), which “reflected the growing Third World
dissent from the international principle embodied in resolution 1803
(XVII).”120 CERDS also acknowledges appropriate compensation, but it
proceeds with a “precatory should,” suggesting that “CERDS has repudiated the principle of compensation as an international regulatory norm.” 121
These developments support the argument that Cuba had the prerogative to
expropriate land after the Cuban Revolution, and that Cuba, not the United
States, has the last word on the disposition of property, even if it owes a
remedy to the original owner.122
D. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Setting aside the inference that third parties who deal in expropriated
property are wrongfully targeted by Title III because either they or the Cuban government holds valid title to the properties, the Helms-Burton Act
poses other concerns, as it violates certain well-established principles of
customary international law.
(1988); O’Connor, supra note 81, at 356; Miriam A. Kadragich, United States Liability for
Expropriations in Foreign Territory: Setting the Standard for Responsibility, 10 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 22, 33-34 (1986).
117. Visser, supra note 116, at 82.
118. Id.; see also O’Connor, supra note 81.
119. Kadragich, supra note 116, at 34. Some have even argued that these states have
no duty to compensate for expropriations unless they have been unjustly enriched. Id.
120. Visser, supra note 116, at 83.
121. Id. at 83-84. Article 2 of CERDS states, “Each state has the right: To nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the state adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the state considers pertinent.”
122. Of course, some disagree with this position and believe that “[a]bsent compensation, an expropriating country cannot transfer legally valid title to third-party purchasers.
There can never be a secure right to private property if a thief can pass good title.” Ortiz,
supra note 17, at 340.
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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

The Act’s greatest encroachment on international law may be its endeavor to control conduct abroad through the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is an aspect of a state’s sovereignty, so it is generally restricted to
the things and persons over which a state has sovereign authority. 123 Territoriality and nationality are the primary bases of such authority. 124 Thus, as
a general rule, a state cannot exercise its powers in the territory of another
state. Given this presumption, the question presented by the Act’s passage
is whether “the United States [is] legally competent to legislate with respect
to properties and activities beyond its territorial boundaries” and within the
sovereign state of Cuba.125 The answer is no, with some exceptions.
a. The Effects Doctrine
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States indicates that some extraterritorial jurisdiction may be recognized
under international law. Section 402 of the Restatement asserts that “a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.”126
This is known as the “effects doctrine,” and it permits a state to address
offenses or acts commenced outside its territory causing serious and harmful consequences to the social and economic order within the state’s territory. Section 403 of the Restatement, however, adds an important limitation:
“a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”127 Section 403 provides several factors
to help determine whether such jurisdiction is reasonable. 128
First, it is doubtful that any substantial effects indeed resulted within
US territory from the expropriations. 129 The “certified claims of U.S. citizens only constitute 5% of the industrial and commercial properties in Cu123. Muse, supra note 89, at 238.
124.
Id.; AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § II.A (Diane
Marie Amann ed., 2014), https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KR5C-7YNZ]. Territoriality refers to “conduct taking place within the
country’s territory, or designed to have effects within the country’s territory,” and nationality
refers to “conduct performed by the country’s nationals.” Id.
125. Muse, supra note 89, at 239.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(1)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1986) (emphasis added). See also Solis, supra note 19, at 721.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(1) (AM. L. INST. 1986) (emphasis added).
128. Id. § 403(2).
129. See Muse, supra note 89, at 261-65.
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ba.”130 While the claims of Cuban-Americans add significantly to that percentage, they contribute nothing to the effects within US territory because
the taking of Cuban citizens’ property did not violate international law and
preceded the Cubans’ arrival to the United States, as well as their attainment of US citizenship.131 Even if effects can be found, they are far too
indirect. Further, it was the Cuban government to cause any such effects,
not the third-party purchasers, developers, or investors who are largely targeted by Title III. Thus, “the exercise of jurisdiction over persons found to
be ‘trafficking’ in [what was once property belonging to Americans] punishes foreign corporations investing in Cuba while legally not touching the
Cuban government.”132
Next, the factors provided under Section 403 indicate that extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case is unreasonable for a number of reasons, including (1) the “trafficking” takes place in Cuba, not the United States; (2) the
“traffickers” are typically not US citizens; (3) the Act ignores Cuba’s interests in implementing its own legal rules regarding real property; and (4) the
international community has not accepted the notion that US citizens should
be allowed to sue for the “trafficking” referred to in the Act. 133 In short,
“[i]t does not appear reasonable for the U.S. government to dictate the investment policies of foreign companies deciding whether to invest in a separate foreign country.”134
Lastly, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction could also be permitted by the passive personality principle, which allows states to claim jurisdiction to try foreign nationals for offenses committed abroad that affect its
own citizens. 135 While US nationals could be considered victims of the Cuban government’s conduct, those US nationals are victims of the uncompensated expropriation, but not plausibly of the “trafficking,” at which Title
III is directed. Thus, once again, the application of US law to conduct
linked to the third-party investors or purchasers should be precluded because it is unreasonable under Section 403.
130. Leslie R. Goldberg, Trade Policy and Election-Year Politics: The Truth About
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 217, 228 n.71 (1997).
131. Muse, supra note 89, at 263-64.
132. Solis, supra note 19, at 722.
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. OF U.S., § 403(2) (AM. L. INST.
1987).
134. S. Kern Alexander, Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban Property: Lender Liability
Under the Helms-Burton Act and Customary International Law, 16 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
523, 559 (1998).
135. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., supra note 124. In addition to territoriality, nationality, and
passive personality, the other two recognized bases for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction
are universality and the protective principle. The former refers to “conduct recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern,” while the latter refers to “conduct directed
against a country’s vital interests.” Id. at II.A-1.
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b. Claims of Cuban-Americans
As explained, Title III provides standing to Cuban-Americans who
were not US citizens when the expropriations took place. Retroactively
extending jurisdiction to this class of claimants is plainly unsupported by
international law. In 1995, before the Helms-Burton Act was passed, David
Wallace, the chairman of the Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims,
urged the Senate to oppose Title III, stating:
[Title III] poses the most serious threat to the property rights of the certified claimants since the Castro regime’s confiscations more than thirty years
ago. . . . In effect, this provision creates within the
federal court system a separate Cuban claims program available to Cuban-Americans who were not
U.S. nationals as of the date of their injury. This
unprecedented conferral of retroactive rights upon
naturalized citizens is not only contrary to international law but raises serious implications with respect to the Cuban Government’s ability to satisfy
the certified claims. Allowing Cuban-Americans to
make potentially tens if not hundreds of thousands
of claims against Cuba in our federal courts may
prevent the U.S. certified claimants from ever receiving the compensation due [to] them under international legal standards.136
As Wallace pointed out, Title III’s extension to Cuban-Americans is a
clear violation of international law because it (1) intervenes with Cuba’s
domestic affairs, and (2) violates the nationality of claims principle. It is
well recognized that “[t]he obligation of states to respect the sovereignty of
other states constitutes the fundamental principle underpinning the structure
of public international law.”137 It is also undisputed that Cuba had the right
to expropriate land of its own nationals under both its own laws and under
international law. In doing so, Cuba did not breach any international legal
obligations owed to the United States. In fact, “confiscations by a state of
the property of its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of
whether compensation has been provided, do not constitute violations of

136. Muse, supra note 89, at 247 n.128 (emphasis added) (citing 141 CONG. REC.
S15, 111 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (letter from David W. Wallace)).
137. Id. at 245.
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international law.”138 Accordingly, Title III is not a “legitimate exercise of
state protection by the United States on behalf of Cuban Americans.” 139
Title III also violates the “nationality of claims” principle, which establishes that eligibility for compensation requires US nationality at the
time of the loss.140 Thus, the Cuban government’s expropriation of property
owned by Cuban nationals should not be actionable in US courts. Yet, Title
III allows just that, thereby exponentially increasing the number of potential
suits and distorting an established international legal principle. 141
2.

The Act of State Doctrine

Next, by unreasonably exercising its jurisdiction over extraterritorial
activities, the Helms-Burton Act also violates the act of state doctrine. This
judicially developed doctrine limits the circumstances under which US
courts will examine the validity of foreign government acts. 142 The doctrine
is premised partly on the concept of sovereignty143 and partly on the basic
relationships between the branches of government. 144
In 1964, the Supreme Court upheld the act of state doctrine in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino with respect to Cuba’s power to expropriate
property of foreigners.145 The Court explained that the doctrine “expresses
the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere.” 146 Clearly uneasy about the
prospect of ruling on the legality of Cuba’s expropriations, the Court made
it clear that “the act of state doctrine required sovereign acts to be treated as
legally operative, and be given effect in the courts of other sovereigns,
whether or not the act in question violated duties imposed by international
law.”147
138. Id. at 248 (emphasis omitted) (citing F. Palicio y Cia. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp.
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
139. Id. (emphasis omitted).
140. Solis, supra note 19, at 724.
141. Id.
142. Alexander, supra note 134, at 555.
143. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.”).
144. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
145. Id. at 439.
146. Id. at 423.
147. John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine, 47 GEO. J. INT’ L L. 507, 511
(2016).
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Congress tried to limit the effect of the act of state doctrine by declaring it inapplicable to actions brought pursuant to Title III. 148 This insistence
that federal courts circumvent the act of state doctrine ignores two facts: (1)
the realm of international relations belongs not to the judicial branch, but to
the legislative and executive branches of government; and (2) the judiciary
possesses “limited competence to pass judgement on a foreign sovereign’s
laws.”149 Thus, Title III misappropriates legislative and executive functions.
3.

Secondary Boycotts

Finally, the Helms-Burton Act operates as a secondary boycott, which
is a violation of both US and international law. 150 The United States has
outwardly opposed such boycotts since 1977, making it a principle of domestic law. 151 It is unlawful for a US individual or entity “to comply with or
further, in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States, ‘any
boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country against a country which is
friendly to the United States.’” 152 In essence, this is exactly what the Act
does, as it imposes sanctions against foreign parties who do business with
or derive economic benefit from Cuban expropriated property. While the
Act may not punish a person for simply trading with Cuba, virtually all
industries and commercial enterprises were expropriated after the Cuban
Revolution, exposing nearly all foreign investors to liability. 153
Title III also violates the rights of third-party states to be free of extreme economic coercion under international trade law. The Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States mentions such coercion twice, once in the preamble
and once under the principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. 154 Under this principle, “[n]o
State may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type
of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from It advantages
of any kind.”155
148. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(6) (1996).
149. Solis, supra note 19, at 724.
150. E.g., Alexander, supra note 134, at 556.
151. Id.
152. Id. In a secondary boycott, state A (the US) mandates that if X, a national of
state B (Canada), trades with state C (Cuba), then X cannot trade with state A (the US). Id.
153. Id. at 557-58.
154. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). The Preamble recalls “the duty of States
to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form
of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State.” Id.
155. Id.
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Secondary boycotts function as non-forcible countermeasures, which
may be employed in order to procure cessation of an internationally wrongful act and achieve reparation for the injury.156 Chapter II of the Articles on
State Responsibility details the purpose, conditions, and limits for countermeasures. Notably, countermeasures are strictly limited to protect against
disproportionality, the violation of third-party rights or peremptory norms,
tendencies toward the escalation of disputes, and bad-faith invocations employed for ulterior motives. 157 Countermeasures are also to be directed
against a state, not individuals or companies, and may not be directed
against states other than the responsible state. 158 Here, the secondary boycott imposed by Title III violates the rights of third-party states and their
nationals to freely invest in Cuba and is disproportionate to the injury suffered. In addition, the liability under Title III is not based on a breach of
any international obligation or duty to the United States, which the Articles
on State Responsibility call for, but only on the act of “trafficking” in expropriated property.159
Finally, the commentary to Article 50 states that the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stressed that “whatever the circumstances, such sanctions should always take full account of the provisions of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” and
that “it is essential to distinguish between the basic objective of applying
political and economic pressure upon the governing elite of a country to
persuade them to conform to international law, and the collateral infliction
of suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the targeted country.”160 It is no secret that Title I’s codification of the Cuban embargo and
Title III’s attack on investors is an attempt to force Cuba to capitulate to US
demands. In fact, Congressman Dan Burton described Title III’s objective
in the following terms:
The real purpose of the bill is to send a very strong
signal to a number of foreign entities that it is in
their best interest not to do business with Fidel
Castro. . . . By getting this message out, we contin156.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2
Y.B.
Int’l
Comm’n
26,
U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part2), https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/eng
lish/ilc_2001_v2_p2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3YD-TMBF].
157. Id. Article 51 references proportionality; peremptory norms are protected under
Article 50; Article 52 lists the conditions an injured state must meet before taking countermeasures; and Article 44 governs the admissibility of claims, while Article 49 governs the
objects and limits of countermeasures. Id.
158. Id. at 130.
159. Alexander, supra note 134, at 557.
160. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 156, at 103.

2021]

THE HELMS-BURTON ACT BACKFIRES

29

ue to keep Fidel Castro from getting the hard currency he needs to survive. 161
Since “there is considerable evidence that the achievement of a world economy based on human dignity requires at least some form of direct foreign
investment,”162 the Helms-Burton Act can be viewed as a form of extreme
economic coercion aimed at undermining Cuba’s independence, a clear
prohibition under the Articles on State Responsibility.
IV. LITIGATION UNDER TITLE III OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
Section IV of this Article shifts focus to how Title III is being applied
in the first rounds of litigation following the activation of the civil remedy
provision. I first detail the two Cuban Claims Programs administered by the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) and the types of US property claims certified by the FCSC. In the next subsection, I take a closer
look at key definitions in the Act, which extend the reach of Title III to virtually every commercial enterprise in Cuba and relatively remote defendants. This background information is key to understanding the breadth of
US property claims in Cuba and the basis for the widespread concern over
Title III’s activation. Finally, in the last set of subsections, I analyze a number of leading Title III lawsuits. These cases exemplify the surprising trends
born from the parties’ filings and the opinions issued by federal courts, and
support my argument for the need to repeal the Helms-Burton Act.
A.

CERTIFIED CLAIMS BY THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
COMMISSION

Long before the Helms-Burton Act became law, on October 16, 1964,
the US government amended the International Claims Settlement Act
(ICSA) of 1949 to facilitate the future settlement of US property claims
against the Cuban government. 163 To this end, Title V was added to the
ICSA authorizing the FCSC, to
receive and determine in accordance with applicable substantive law, including international law, the
amount and validity of claims by nationals of the
United States against the Government of Cuba . . .
arising since January 1, 1959 . . . from the national161. Muse, supra note 89, at 221.
162. Visser, supra note 116, at 88.
163. Act of Oct. 16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1110 (amending the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of 1949, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1643).
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ization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking
of, or special measures directed against, property . .
. [of] nationals of the United States.164
The FCSC is an independent, quasi-judicial entity within the US Department of Justice that adjudicates the claims of US nationals against foreign governments pursuant to (1) international claims settlement agreements, (2) specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, or (3) the request of
the Secretary of State.165 The FCSC has conducted two Cuban Claims Programs.166 The first program, authorized by Title V of the ICSA, lasted from
1964 to 1972 and covered claims for losses which occurred on or after January 1, 1959.167 The FCSC adjudicated a total of 8,816 claims and found
5,911 of those claims to be compensable. 168 The total principal value of
those claims was $1,851,057,358.00.169 Then, in 2005, Secretary of State

164. Id. Title V also provided for the determination of claims for “disability or death
of nationals of the United States out of violations of international law by the Government of
Cuba.” Importantly, Title V does not provide for the payment of these losses, but merely
certifies the validity and the amount of the losses to provide the Secretary of State with
appropriate information for future negotiation. See id.
165.
About the Commission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (July 10, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/about-commission [https://perma.cc/6CYY-VMBR].
The FCSC was established in 1954 when it assumed the functions of two predecessor agencies: the War Claims Commission and the International Claims Commission. The FCSC and
its predecessor agencies have successfully completed 43
claims programs to resolve claims against numerous countries
including Germany, Iran . . ., Bulgaria . . ., the Soviet Union,
Cuba, China . . ., and Vietnam. More than 660,000 claims have
been adjudicated, with awards totaling in the billions of dollars.
Id. Funds for payment of the awards are derived from congressional appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in the U.S by the Departments of
Justice and the Treasury. Id.
166.
Completed Programs-Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 18, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba [https://perma.cc/A27U-3H7P].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The below statistics are from FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF
THE UNITED STATES, SECTION II COMPLETION OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM UNDER TITLE
V
OF
THE
INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT
ACT
OF
1949,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/final-report-cuba-1972.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2J2-MCV3].
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Condoleezza Rice requested a second program to adjudicate claims for uncompensated expropriation of property that arose after May 1, 1967, and
that had not been adjudicated during the first Cuban Claims Program. 170
The FCSC received only five claims this time; two of those claims were
certified as valid in the principal amounts of $51,128,926.95 and
$16,000.171

Id.

170. Id. For the Secretary of State request, see Letter from Secretary of State, Condaleeza Rice, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Mauricio J. Tamargo, Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S., Dep’t of Justice (July 5, 2005) (on file with
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/06/23/cuba_ii_a.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/7C9U-2KF6].
171.
Completed Programs-Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 18, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba [https://perma.cc/A27U-3H7P].
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In 2015, The Brookings Institution published a report detailing the position of the United States and Cuba with respect to compensation of property claims, and closely reexamining the types of certified claims along
with the amount of loss certified. 172 The results are a reminder of the United
States’ broad corporate reach in Cuba in the 1950s. The largest fifty claims,
which account for $1.5 billion, belong to companies like United Fruit Sugar
Company, Exxon, Starwood Hotels and Resorts (Sheraton and Westin
Chains), Texaco, Coca-Cola, Colgate-Palmolive, American Brands (formerly American Tobacco), Chase Manhattan Bank (now JPMorgan Chase),
IBM World Trade Corporation, General Electric, and General Motors. 173
The largest claim, valued at $267,568,413.62, is owned by Cuban Electric
Company, which has a majority of its shares held by Office Depot, Inc. 174
Corporate claims total 899 and account for the “lion’s share” of the total
value of certified claims.175 Conversely, claims of individual US citizens
account for the large number of total claims but typically carry much lower
loss values. 176 Of the total 5,014 individual claims, only thirty-nine are
larger than $1 million and only four claims exceed $5 million in value. 177
While the nearly 6,000 claims—worth close to $2 billion178—are not
insignificant, experts predicted that lifting Title III’s decades-long suspension would open the door to hundreds of thousands of lawsuits.179 This is
172. FEINBERG, supra note 17.
173. Id. at 18.
174. See supra statistics accompanying note 169. The Cuban Electric Company was
Havana’s major power utility at the time it was seized. Because the majority of its shares
belong to Office Depot, the claim is owned by Office Depot. See Nick Miroff, The 20 largest U.S. property claims in Cuba, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:55 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/12/08/the-20-largest-u-sproperty-claims-in-cuba/ [https://perma.cc/V4GQ-TKSJ]. Office Depot, Inc. and OfficeMax
Incorporated merged in 2013, and the combined company now uses the name of Office
Depot, Inc. See Office Depot and OfficeMax Complete Merger, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov.
5,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12978/000119312513433122/d624667dex991.htm
[https://perma.cc/YB8V-SG33].
175. FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 18-19.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2, 29. This figure does not include the 6 percent per annum interest set by
the Commission. Id. Title III also provides for interest on the monetary damages awarded. §
6082 (a)(1)(B) of the Libertad Act states that interest is to be based on the standard civil
judgments statute, which calculates interest “from the date of the entry of the judgment at a
rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding.” 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2000).
179. E.g., Francesca Paris, Trump Administration Announces Measures Against
Cuba,
Venezuela
and
Nicaragua,
WBUR
NEWS
(Apr.
18,
2019),
https://www.wbur.org/npr/714552854/trump-administration-announces-measures-against-
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because there are potentially hundreds of thousands of Cuban-Americans
who were not US citizens when their properties were expropriated and who,
therefore, did not have their claims certified, since Title V of the ICSA only
allowed the FCSC to consider claims for property “owned wholly or partially, directly or indirectly by a national of the United States on the date of
the loss.”180 However, as discussed, the Helms-Burton Act was drafted with
the intention of granting standing to these newly naturalized CubanAmericans. Accordingly, claimants with uncertified claims can still bring
an action under Title III if they were ineligible to file a claim with the
FCSC during the filing period.181
B.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ACT: KEY TERMS AND PRELIMINARY
LITIGATION PATTERNS

The large pool of potential plaintiffs, the Act’s broad definition of
“traffics” and “property,” and the monetary damages at stake are all unique
factors that were expected to trigger a flood of lawsuits against parties benefiting from expropriated properties. After all, Title III is not only targeted
at the Cuban government—the successor-in-interest to former property
owners—but it is also directed at individuals, entities, agencies, and other
instrumentalities of foreign states that (1) have purchased or otherwise
transferred expropriated property, (2) use or benefit from expropriated
property while engaging in a commercial activity, and (3) participate in or
benefit from a third party’s trafficking in expropriated property, among
other prohibited acts.182
The Act defines “property” to mean “any property (including patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and any other form of intellectual property), whether real, personal, or mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest.” 183 However,
property does not include real property used for
residential purposes unless, as of March 12,
1996—
cuba-venezuela-and-nicaragua [https://perma.cc/G4UX-R5JP]; see also supra Section III.
D.1.b.
180. 22 U.S.C. § 1643c(a) (emphasis added). It is estimated that more than 200,000
Cubans fled the island by 1962 and approximately 1.4 million Cubans have left since then.
HOLDEN & VILLARS, supra note 7, at 54.
181. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(5)(A) (1996). US nationals who were eligible to file a
claim with the FCSC under Title V of the ICSA but did not do so may not bring an action on
that claim under Title III. Id.
182. Id. § 6023(13)(A).
183. Id. § 6023(12)(A).
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(i) the claim to the property is held by a United
States national and the claim has been certified under title V of the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949; or
(ii) the property is occupied by an official of the
Cuban Government or the ruling political party in
Cuba.184
Ultimately, nearly every commercial enterprise on the island is at risk of
being the subject of a Title III action.
Notably, the Helms-Burton Act specifies that the term “traffics” does
not include the following:
(i) the delivery of international telecommunication
signals to Cuba;
(ii) the trading or holding of securities publicly
traded or held, unless the trading is with or by a
person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
to be a specially designated national;
(iii) transactions and uses of property incident to
lawful travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary to the
conduct of such travel; or
(iv) transactions and uses of property by a person
who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.185
These definitions and exceptions are being litigated and likely will continue
to be until their role and reach become settled.
As for the damages a defendant could be liable for—they are significant. Defendants could be on the hook for much more than the economic
benefit they receive from the property. According to Section 6082, damages
in a successful lawsuit would be awarded in an amount equal to the greatest
of three alternatives: (1) the fair market value of the property, calculated as
184. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
185. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B) (1996). See supra page 9 for acts that qualify as “trafficking” under § 6023(13)(A).
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being either the current value of the property, or the value of the property
when confiscated plus interest, whichever is greater; (2) if certified by the
FCSC, the amount of the certified claim, plus interest; 186 or (3) if not certified by the FCSC, the value of the ownership claim as determined by a
court-appointed “special master.”187 Defendants also risk facing court costs
and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 188 The advantage to bringing an action for a
certified claim under Title III is that a certification by the FCSC is conclusive proof of ownership of an interest in property. 189 Certified claims also
benefit from a presumption that the FCSC’s valuation is correct and are
eligible for treble damages under Title III. 190
With so much money at stake, legal, commercial, and political sectors
all around the world were on edge after the activation of the previously
dormant civil-remedy provision on May 2, 2019. The Canadian Minister of
Foreign Affairs stated in an official press release:
Canada is deeply disappointed with today’s announcement. . . . Since the U.S. announced in January it would review Title III, the Government of
Canada has been regularly engaged with the U.S.
government to raise our concerns about the possible negative consequences for Canadians—
concerns that are long-standing and well known to
our U.S. partners. . . . I have also discussed this issue with the EU. I have been in contact with Canadian businesses to reaffirm we will fully defend the

186. Id. § 6082 (a)(1)(A)(i).
187. Id. § 6083(a)(2).
188. Id. § 6082 (a)(1)(A)(ii).
189. Id. § 6083(a)(1). The Cuban Claims Programs are largely considered to be credible. The FCSC was transparent, as it published an extensive report on the completion of the
First Program along with a collection of select lead cases and an online index of all of its
decisions. The FCSC took seven years to vet the claims, rejected a great number of cases
(2,908 in total), reduced the proposed value of some, and even employed external experts to
assist when needed. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 20. However, the FCSC’s methodology
has also been criticized by some because it had no access to Cuban property registries and
did not conduct on-site inspections. Further, because FCSC adjudications are ex parte and
non-adversarial, the Cuban Government could not examine or challenge the evidence presented by the claimants or present its own contradictory evidence. There is also no appeals
process and parties disagree on the proper method for calculating fair market value. Id. at
21-22.
190. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(2), 6082(a)(3)(A) (1996). Treble damages are available
for successful uncertified claims only if plaintiffs provide defendants with a 30-day “cease
and desist” notice before bringing suit. Id. §§ 6082(a)(3)(B)(ii), (a)(3)(C), (a)(3)(D).
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interests of Canadians conducting legitimate trade
and investment with Cuba.191
Similarly, the High Representative on behalf of the EU made the following declaration:
The European Union deeply regrets the full
activation of the 1996 Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD)
Act by the United States. The decision to activate
Title III, and opening the way for action under Title IV, is a breach of the commitments undertaken
in the EU-US agreements of 1997 and 1998, which
had been respected by both sides without interruption since then. This will cause unnecessary friction and undermines trust and predictability in the
transatlantic partnership.
The EU considers the extra-territorial application
of unilateral restrictive measures to be contrary to
international law and will draw on all appropriate
measures to address the effects of the HelmsBurton Act, including in relation to its WTO rights
and through the use of the EU Blocking Statute.192
In an unexpected turn of events, however, the flood of lawsuits that international communities were anticipating turned out to be little more than a
trickle. In the first three months of Title III’s activation, only nine cases
were filed. After an entire year, twenty-five were filed, and as of May
2021—two years after President Trump officially lifted Title III’s suspension—only forty-some lawsuits were filed. 193 Even more surprising is the
191. Government of Canada Will Defend Interests of Canadians Doing Business in
Cuba, GLOB. AFFS. CAN. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/news/2019/04/government-of-canada-will-defend-interests-of-canadians-doingbusiness-in-cuba.html [https://perma.cc/3H8V-BDMG].
192. Council of the European Union Press Release 327/19, Declaration by the High
Representative on behalf of the EU on the full activation of the Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD)
Act by the United States (May 2, 2019), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2019/05/02/declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-fullactivation-of-the-helms-burton-libertad-act-by-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/9984F29C].
193. See infra Appendix for a list of the Title III lawsuits filed during this time. Cases transferred to a different venue (Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., for example) or refiled
with a different set of defendants (Echevarria v. Trivago GmbH, for example) were counted
only once despite showing up on more than one court docket.
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unintended impact Title III has had on American businesses. The Trump
Administration may have thought that permitting Title III lawsuits would
scare foreign investors out of Cuba; however, due to difficulties with suing
foreign corporations, many of the early defendants have been US companies. If the violations of the various principles of customary international
law discussed in Section III were not enough to reverse the controversial
Libertad Act, the unforeseen targeting of domestic companies that has now
come to light is further proof that Title III’s activation has been unsuccessful and that the US legislature should consider the statute’s repeal.
In the remainder of Section IV, I explore the developments in fourteen
of the twenty-five cases filed during the first year of Title III’s operation. I
divided these cases into three waves—based roughly on the date the complaints were filed and the types of defendants targeted. The cases in the first
two waves were filed within the first six months of Title III’s activation and
are against a variety of travel and hotel related entities. The cases in the
third wave steer away from this pattern and are against producers and
sellers of goods. I analyze the complaints, motions to dismiss, responses,
and other filings, along with any applicable court orders. Thirteen of the
fourteen cases have produced substantive court rulings on reoccurring legal
issues centered on: (1) personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Article
III standing; (3) the element of scienter; (4) the application of Section
6082(a)(4)(B) of the Act to the inheritance of claims; (5) the “lawful travel”
exception under the Act; and (6) constitutional issues such as violations of
the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses, excessive and punitive damages, and impermissibly vague definitions under the Act. Four of the fourteen
cases managed to proceed to the discovery stage. Eight cases were dismissed, and those decisions have been appealed by the plaintiffs in the
Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts. One case has been stayed pending
an appellate decision in its respective circuit, and another case was administratively closed. Two appellate decisions have been entered by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuit as of January 7, 2022.
C.

FIRST WAVE OF LAWSUITS

1.

Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., and Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co.

Following the activation of Title III in May 2019, the first wave of
lawsuits targeted a mix of US, Cuban, and other foreign defendants. On the
first day possible, Havana Docks Corporation (“Havana Docks”), a Delaware corporation, sued Carnival Corporation (“Carnival”), a foreign corpo-
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ration headquartered in Florida and a well-known cruise line, for allegedly
“trafficking” in its confiscated property.194 Havana Docks and its predecessor owned commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Havana
known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 1917 to 1960.195 After the
property was confiscated by the Cuban government on October 24, 1960,
Havana Docks had its claim certified by the FCSC for a total loss value of
$9,179,700.88, a claim that has not expired or been abandoned by the plaintiff.196 Pursuant to a land concession, Havana Docks had the right to use,
improve, construct upon, operate, and manage the property for a term of
ninety-nine years—a term that was cut short.197 Because the property was
confiscated before the term ended, Havana Docks argued that it retains “a
reversionary interest of 44 years remaining in the Subject Property (i.e., a
future or contingent possessory right).” 198
In its complaint, Havana Docks alleged that from May 1, 2016, Carnival “knowingly and intentionally commenced, conducted, and promoted its
commercial cruise line business to Cuba using the Subject Property by regularly embarking and disembarking its passengers . . . without the authorization of Plaintiff or any U.S. national who holds a claim to the Subject
Property.”199 Havana Docks further alleged that Carnival “knowingly and
intentionally participated in and profited from the communist Cuban Government’s possession of the Subject Property without the authorization of
Plaintiff.”200 In response, Carnival moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Havana Docks
(1) failed to allege that Carnival’s use of the confiscated property was not
“incident to lawful travel” and (2) did not have an ownership interest in the
confiscated property at the time Carnival began utilizing it.201
On August 27, 2019, the US District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied Carnival’s motion. 202 In regard to the statutory exception of
“lawful travel,” the court acknowledged that Carnival’s use of the confiscated property may not be “trafficking” because it may be subject to the
194. Complaint, Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21724 (S.D.
Fla. May 2, 2019); see also Amended Complaint, Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp.,
No. 1:19-cv-21724 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020).
195. Amended Complaint, supra note 194, ¶¶ 6-7.
196. Id. ¶ 13.
197. Id. ¶ 15.
198. Id.
199. Complaint, supra note 194, ¶ 12.
200. Id. ¶ 13.
201. Carnival Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21724 (S.D. Fla. May 30,
2019).
202. Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, 2019 WL 8895241, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2019).
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carve-out provision outlined in the Act’s definitions; however, the court
also explained that “such argument is not appropriate at this stage of litigation.”203 Agreeing with the arguments made by Havana Docks, the court
held that “the lawful travel statutory exception is not an element of the offense, but rather an affirmative defense on which the Defendant bears the
burden of proof.”204 In short, the court concluded that Havana Docks had
sufficiently pled all material elements under the Helms-Burton Act and was
not required “‘to go a step further’ beyond the elements articulated in the
statute and state that the alleged trafficking was not ‘incident to’ or ‘necessary for’ lawful travel.”205
In regard to Havana Docks’ claim to the confiscated property, Carnival
argued that the claim was a time-limited concession that expired in 2004,
meaning that Carnival could not be found liable because the alleged trafficking commenced in 2016.206 Once again agreeing with Havana Docks’
position, the court held that Carnival “incorrectly conflates a claim to a
property and a property interest.”207 The plain language of the Act provides
that “any person . . . that traffics in property which was confiscated by the
Cuban Government . . . shall be liable to any United States national who
owns the claim to such property,” meaning that the Act does not expressly
state that such trafficking needs to take place while a party holds a property
interest in the property at issue.208
Likely encouraged by this favorable holding, Havana Docks proceeded
to file three additional actions against other well-known cruise lines: MSC
Cruises (“MSC”), Royal Caribbean Cruises (“Royal Caribbean”), and Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings (“NCL”). 209 MSC and NCL both moved to
dismiss the complaints and argued, among other things, that Havana Docks’
claim fails as a matter of law because its interest in the confiscated property
was a leasehold interest that expired in 2004, so it could only assert a claim
203. Carnival Corp., 2019 WL 8895241, at *3.
204. Id. at *2.
205. Id. at *4.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Carnival Corp., 2019 WL 8895241, at *4 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6082(A)).
209. Complaint, Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., No. 1:19-cv-23588
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2019); Complaint, Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23590 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2019); Complaint, Havana Docks Corp. v.
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23591 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2019). Both
NCL and Royal Caribbean are foreign defendants with headquarters in Miami, Florida.
Complaint, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23591, ¶ 3; Complaint,
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23590, ¶ 3. While MSC Cruises is a Swiss
company, the defendants in the MSC suit—MSC Cruises SA Co and MSC Cruises (USA)
Inc.—are a Florida and Delaware Corporation, respectively, each with a principal place of
business in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Complaint, MSC Cruises SA Co., No. 1:19-cv-23588, ¶¶
3-4.
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for trafficking under Title III for conduct that occurred prior to the expiration of that interest.210 Surprisingly, Judge Beth Bloom (the same judge
presiding over the Carnival case) changed her mind and decided to reconsider her initial ruling. On January 7, 2020, following a closer look at the
statute, the court granted both the MSC and NCL motions to dismiss. 211
The court held that “the property interest in this case is time-limited by
its terms, and the claim that Plaintiff owns is a claim covering the timelimited interest, which expired in 2004.”212 Citing the plain language of the
statute, the court explained that the certification by the FCSC relates only to
the specific interest held by a party. Here, Havana Docks held a leasehold
interest, meaning that one would have to traffic in the leasehold to be liable
to the owner of the claim. 213 Following the end of the concession in 2004,
the property (had it not been confiscated) would have reverted to the Cuban
government. Because the defendants’ activities occurred after 2004, the
court held that Havana Docks does not have the right “to sue for activities
that took place years after it no longer has an interest in the property.” 214
This interpretation, the court explained, is also consistent with the fundamental principles of US property law, which consider property to be a
“bundle of rights.”215 This well-established principle suggests that a person’s interest in property extends only as far as the rights he has acquired
from the bundle, meaning that because Havana Docks possessed a leasehold interest, it would be entitled to the value of the lease during its applicable term, not beyond. 216 Ultimately, the court ruled that Havana Docks

210. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum
of Law, Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., No. 1:19-cv-23588 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11,
2019); Norwegian’s Motion to Dismiss, Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23591 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2019). Because the court’s opinion is
virtually identical in these cases, I am citing to arguments and holdings made only in MSC to
avoid redundancy. Royal Caribbean did not move to dismiss but instead filed an answer and
affirmative defenses on October 4, 2019.
211. Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., 431 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (S.D. Fla.
2020); Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 431 F. Supp. 3d 1375
(S.D. Fla. 2020).
212. MSC Cruises SA Co., 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1372.
213. Id. The court cites 22 U.S.C. § 6083(a)(1): “the court shall accept as conclusive
proof of ownership of an interest in property a certification of a claim to ownership of that
interest that has been made by the . . . Commission,” and explained that “[a]ny other interpretation of the Act would require the Court to ignore the definition of ‘property,’ and the
qualifying words ‘such’ and ‘that’ out of the liability of imposing language and conclusiveness of certified claims language, respectively—which would run afoul of basic canons of
statutory interpretation.” MSC Cruises SA Co., 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1372.
214. Id. at 1373.
215. Id. at 1372.
216. Id.
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failed to state a claim for trafficking under Title III of the Act because the
defendants’ activities did not take place between 1960 and 2004. 217
Making this string of cases even messier, Havana Docks moved for reconsideration of the court’s MSC Order and requested leave to file an
amended complaint, contending that the court made errors of fact and law
and, if permitted, it could allege other facts to cure any deficiencies noted
by the court.218 MSC argued that reconsideration was unwarranted because
Havana Docks was trying to relitigate its previous arguments, but the court
disagreed and granted the motion.219
To come to this new decision, the court recognized that it had made
impermissible findings of fact—namely that Havana Docks’ concession
expired in 2004.220 A closer look at Havana Docks’ certified claim revealed
that there is no temporal limitation on the claim. Rather, the FCSC had noted that the terms of the concession were to expire in the year 2004, had the
leasehold interest run its course without interruption. Accordingly, the court
had made an incorrect factual finding that the concession actually expired
in 2004.221 Additionally, the court had overlooked other certified property
interests in fixtures and equipment that were not time-limited like Havana
Docks’ interest in the real property. 222
Based on these factual errors, the court also made a number of errors
of law that were in conflict with the district court’s holding in a 2005 unlawful trespass and unjust enrichment case, Glen v. Club Méditerranée
S.A.223 and the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of that holding. 224 In Club
Méditerranée S.A., the court relied on Sabbatino, where the US Supreme
Court acknowledged the authority of the Cuban government to expropriate
property within its borders and to vest the property right in the state. 225
Thus, Havana Docks’ former ownership interest now manifests itself into a
claim for compensation under both US and international legal principles,
217. Id. at 1374.
218. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Amend, and Request for
Hearing, Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., No. 19-cv-23588 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31,
2020).
219. Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., 455 F. Supp. 3d 1355 (S.D. Fla.
2020).
220. Id. at 1366.
221. Id. at 1367.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1368; 365 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Based on Sabbatino, the
district court held that the act of state doctrine mandates dismissal of the plaintiffs’ unjust
enrichment and trespass claim. Id. at 1267. The decision in Club Méditerranée S.A. is also
raised in Glen’s case against Visa. See infra Section IV.D.2.
224. Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding. Id. at 1252.
225. MSC Cruises SA Co., 455 F. Supp. 3d at 1368.
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but Havana Docks does not own the expropriated property. 226 The court
stated that it had “construed the liability provision of § 6082(a)(1)(A) too
narrowly,”227 reasoning that “notably absent from the definition of ‘traffics’
is any limitation on the scope of ‘trafficking’ to only a specific ‘interest in
property.’”228 The court also conceded that it mistakenly held that Havana
Docks would possibly recover additional compensation beyond what it was
entitled, in contradiction of the “bundle of sticks” principle. 229 Upon reconsideration of the facts and law, the court explained that “[t]he amount of
monetary damages memorialized in the Certified Claim . . . is the dollar
value of the remainder of the leasehold term that Plaintiff was deprived of,
coupled with the value of the other itemized property interests delineated in
the Certified Claim, and this discrete amount would not change depending
on the time of the trafficking.”230
Havana Docks proceeded to file amended complaints against the
cruise lines, which led to another round of briefings and discovery disputes.
NCL filed a motion to dismiss, which the court denied on September 1,
2020.231 This time, NCL asserted three chief bases for dismissal of the suit:
(1) Havana Docks lacks Article III standing to
sue because it cannot allege injury in fact that is
traceable to NCL’s conduct; (2) Applying Title III
to NCL’s pre-May 2019 operations in Cuba violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such application would be both retroactive and punitive; and
(3) Applying Title III to NCL’s operations in Cuba
violates the Due Process Clause because NCL was
not given fair notice of its potential liability
through the Act’s retroactive application. 232
The law of standing under Article III of the US Constitution ensures
that a plaintiff is actually entitled to have the judiciary decide the merits of
its case. Plaintiffs must demonstrate three elements to meet Article III’s
standing requirement: (1) an injury-in-fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the
actions of the defendant and (3) that can be redressed by a favorable judg-

226. Id.
227. Id. at 1369.
228. Id. at 1371.
229. Id. at 1373-74.
230. MSC Cruises SA Co., 455 F. Supp. 3d at 1373.
231. Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d
1215 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
232. Id. at 1224.
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ment of a court.233 The court first found that Havana Docks properly alleged
facts to support the elements of injury-in-fact because it showed an invasion
of a legally protected property interest that is concrete, particularized, and
imminent.234 NCL “contend[ed] that the only injury Havana Docks has asserted is the confiscation, which is only traceable to the Cuban Government, not to NCL.”235 In rejecting this argument, the court relied on a number of US Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases, which provide that
“[p]roximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing”236 and
“[e]ven harms that flow indirectly from the action in question can be said to
be ‘fairly traceable’ to that action for standing purposes.” 237 The court reasoned that “[i]n enacting Title III, Congress recognized that there exists a
causal link between a claimant’s injury from the Cuban Government’s expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker’s unjust enrichment
from its use of that confiscated property.”238 Because the Supreme Court
has previously found that Congress has the power to “articulate chains of
causation,” when it comes to standing, the court here held that “any argument that the causal chain ceases with the Cuban Government falls
short.”239
The court also rejected NCL’s two constitutional grounds for dismissal
of the case. NCL argued that the suit is a violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause because Title III laid dormant since the statute’s passage in 1996,
thereby having no real legal effect and consequence until the suspension
was lifted in May 2019.240 The court disagreed, holding that “liability for
trafficking under Title III attached beginning on November 1, 1996, and the
consistent suspension of the right to bring an action under Title III did not
affect this liability.”241 To come to the conclusion that Title III was indeed
233. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
234. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1227-28.
235. Id. at 1226.
236. Id. at 1229 (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118, 134 n.6 (2014)).
237. Id. at 1230 (citing Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344
F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003)).
238. Id.
239. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1230 (citing Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). The court goes on to state that NCL’s reliance
on Trichell v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020), a recent
case on Article III standing, “misses the mark because Trichell does not stand for the notion
that such causal links are insufficient to establish Article III standing, where a concrete and
particularized injury otherwise exists.” Id.
240. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1231. The Ex Post
Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of a law, among other things. Id.
241. Id. at 1236. While the Act became effective on March 12, 1996, Title III became
effective on August 1, 1996 and provides for a three-month grace period after the effective
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in effect at the time of NCL’s alleged conduct in Cuba, the court relied on
explicit language from the Act as well as President Clinton’s statements:
I will allow Title III to come into force. As a result,
all companies doing business in Cuba are hereby
on notice that by trafficking in expropriated American property, they face the prospect of lawsuits
and significant liability in the United States. . . .
[W]ith Title III in effect, liability will be established irreversibly during the suspension period
and suits could be brought immediately when the
suspension is lifted. And for that very same reason,
foreign companies will have a strong incentive to
immediately cease trafficking in expropriated
property, the only sure way to avoid future lawsuits.242
Finally, the court held “[n]either the government’s encouragement and
licensure nor the history of suspending Title III is sufficient to establish the
lack of fair notice under the Due Process Clause.”243 Having already rejected NCL’s retroactive application argument, the court augmented its reasoning by reminding NCL that it “had an obligation to familiarize itself with
the mandates of Title III, especially once it began operating in Cuba.”244
Following the court’s denial of NCL’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint, it proceeded to also deny MSC and Carnival’s motions to
dismiss in September 2020.245 Royal Caribbean, on the other hand, filed a

date, making November 1, 1996 the date liability attached for “trafficking.” 22 U.S.C. §§
6085(a), 6082(a)(1)(A) (1996).
242. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1233-34 (citing
Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, 2 Pub. Papers 1136, 1137-38 (July 16, 1996)), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book2/pdf/PPP-1996-book2-docpg1136.pdf (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 1237. NCL argued that due to the consistent suspension of Title III and the
US Government’s encouragement of relations with Cuba, it lacked the requisite notice that it
could still be liable for its conduct. Id.
244. Id. (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982), which holds that
“[g]enerally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford
the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.”).
245. Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., No. 1:19-cv-23588, 2020 WL
5367318 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2020); Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv21724, 2020 WL 5517590 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2020).
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motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was dismissed in April
2020.246
Thereafter, all four cases proceeded with discovery, and on September
20, 2021, Carnival, MSC, Royal Caribbean, and NCL filed an omnibus
motion for summary judgment arguing that they are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law based on four key points.247 First, the defendants never
“trafficked” in plaintiff’s property because Havana Docks never owned the
waterfront property in question; rather, the piers and terminal were always
owned by the Cuban government, and Havana Docks had been granted a
non-exclusive right to operate a cargo business on that property. 248 Second,
defendants’ use of the property was “incident to lawful travel to Cuba” and
“necessary to the conduct of such travel,” which is an exception to the definition of “trafficking” under the Act.249 Third, Havana Docks is not a US
national as required under Section 6082(a)(1)(A) of the Act because its
place of business is in the United Kingdom. 250 And fourth, Havana Docks’
interpretation of the Act raises significant constitutional concerns, since (1)
the requested damages violate the proportionality principle of the Due Process Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment; (2)
plaintiff’s interpretation of the Act renders it an impermissible Ex Post Facto Law; and (3) defendants cannot be held liable for conduct that the US
government permits.251 As of January 7, 2022, the court has not ruled on
defendants’ motion.
2.

Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., and Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

Carnival has been simultaneously defending a second lawsuit filed by
Javier Garcia-Bengochea, a US citizen and resident of Jacksonville, Flori246. Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23590,
2020 WL 1905219 (S.D. Fla. Apr.17, 2020). Royal Caribbean also argued that plaintiff’s
claim had expired at the same time as the expiration of its leasehold interest; however, the
court had already dismissed this argument in its April 2020 Orders on MSC’s and NCL’s
motions for reconsideration described above. Id. at *6.
247. Defendants’ Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3, Havana Docks
Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21724 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2021).
248. Id. at 3-4.
249. Id. at 12. Defendants make clear that their travel to Cuba was “licensed, authorized, and encouraged by the United States government.” Id. at 13. In fact, “OFAC [had]
promulgated a general license authorizing cruise lines to transport passengers to Cuba.” Id.
Notably, defendants state that they also stopped sailing to Cuba once the regulations were
amended and licenses were revoked. Id. at 15.
250. Defendants’ Omnibus Motion, supra note 247, at 24-25.
251. Id. at 27-30. Plaintiff is seeking a collective $2.8 billion in damages from defendants. Id. at 30.
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da.252 Garcia-Bengochea claims an 82.5 percent interest in commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba—only 32.5 percent of
his interest was certified by the FCSC, while the remaining portion of the
interest is based upon a non-certified claim. 253 The total loss value of the
claim is $547,365.24 together with interest of 5 percent per annum from the
date of the loss. 254 In his complaint, Garcia-Bengochea alleged that Carnival
“knowingly and intentionally commenced, conducted, and promoted its
commercial cruise line business to Cuba using the Subject Property by regularly embarking and disembarking its passengers on the Subject Property
without the authorization of Plaintiff.” 255
On August 26, 2019, following an initial round of briefings, 256 the US
District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Carnival’s motion
to dismiss and delivered three main holdings in response to Carnival’s arguments. 257 First, as in the Havana Docks cases, the court held that a plaintiff does not have to go a step further and plead facts stating that a defendant’s use of the property was not incident to lawful travel. The “lawful travel” exception is an affirmative defense that Carnival, not GarciaBengochea, must prove. 258 Second, the court disagreed that GarciaBengochea’s complaint was flawed because the certified claim is not in his
name, but in the name of Albert J. Parreno—there was plenty of time for
Garcia-Bengochea to acquire ownership from 1970, when the claim was
certified, to present day when Garcia-Bengochea filed the suit. 259 According
to the court, such an inquiry involves factual determinations that are inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. 260 Third, the court was not persuaded by Carnival’s assertion that Garcia-Bengochea does not own a direct
interest in the confiscated property since he only had stock ownership in a
company that in turn owned the docks at issue. 261 After examining the text
and purpose of the Libertad Act and the ICSA, and after applying the basic
252. Complaint at ¶ 1, Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21725 (S.D.
Fla. May 2, 2019).
253. Id. ¶¶ 6-11.
254. Id. at Exhibit A, p. 11.
255. Id. ¶ 12.
256. Carnival filed a motion to dismiss on May 30, 2019. Garcia-Bengochea filed a
response in opposition on June 24, 2019, and Carnival filed a reply brief on July 8, 2019.
Additionally, the court heard oral arguments on the motion on July 31, 2019.
257. Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 1281 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26,
2019).
258. Id. at 1286.
259. Id. at 1288.
260. Id. The court also addressed the fact that plaintiff alleged that a portion of his
interest is based on an uncertified claim, which is not contradicted by the FCSC certification.
Id. at 1289.
261. Garcia-Bengochea, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 1289.
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canons of statutory interpretation, the court concluded that “a claim to confiscated property is substantially broader than a direct interest in such property”262 and Garcia-Bengochea had plausibly alleged a claim to the confiscated property based on his stock ownership.263
Carnival proceeded to file a motion for certification for interlocutory
appeal, which was denied on September 26, 2019.264 Less than two months
later, Carnival filed a second amended answer, followed by a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.265 This time, Carnival not only argued that Garcia-Bengochea does not own the claim at issue, but also that, even if he did
validly inherit the claim, the action is barred under Section 6082(a)(4)(B) of
the Act because Garcia-Bengochea acquired the claim after the cutoff date
of March 12, 1996.266 Section 6082(a)(4)(B) states: “In the case of property
confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring
a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership
of the claim before March 12, 1996.”267
On July 9, 2020, the court denied Carnival’s motion on the question of
valid inheritance, but granted it on the question of whether Section
6082(a)(4)(B) bars the action.268 With respect to the inheritance argument,
each side submitted competing evidence and affidavits relating to GarciaBengochea’s inheritance of the claim. 269 The court found that the issues
involved could not be appropriately resolved on a motion for judgment on

262. Id. at 1289. The ICSA of 1949 specifically states that “claims against the governments of Cuba or China may be based on property ‘owned wholly or partially, directly or
indirectly by a national of the United States on the date of the loss’” Id. at 1290 (quoting 22
U.S.C. § 1643c (emphasis added)).
263. Id. at 1289-90.
264. Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21725, 2019 WL 7945691 at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2019). Carnival asked the court to certify its order for interlocutory
appeal on the following issue: “[W]hether Helms-Burton, contrary to normal principles of
corporate law, gives plaintiff a ‘claim’ to property when the plaintiff’s relationship to that
property is that he or she owned shares (or traces ownership of the claim to someone who
owned shares) in a corporation that owned the property, and that corporation is a Cuban
corporation.” Id.
265. Carnival Corporation d/b/a Carnival Cruise Line’s Second Amended Answer
and Affirmative Defenses, Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21725 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 14, 2019).
266. Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21725, 2020 WL 4590825 at
*1 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2020) (summarizing defendant’s second amended answer).
267. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B) (1996) (emphasis added).
268. Garcia-Bengochea, 2020 WL 4590825 at *1.
269. Id. Carnival submitted over five hundred pages of evidence and numerous affidavits from legal experts concluding that Garcia-Bengochea did not take any assets under
Desiderio Parreno’s will (plaintiff’s cousin) because he did not appear at the probate proceeding to accept the inheritance. Garcia-Bengochea submitted his own affidavit from the
very attorney who prepared Parreno’s will to rebut Carnival’s conclusions.
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the pleadings.270 The court, however, agreed with Carnival’s second argument, reasoning that the term “acquire” in Section 6082(a)(4)(B) is broad
enough to cover an inheritance, contrary to Garcia-Bengochea’s assertion
that the term necessitates an affirmative action to obtain the property and
that an inheritance is a “passive concept.”271 The court referenced the legislative history of the Act in coming to its decision, which “clearly explains
that Congress wanted ‘to eliminate any incentive that might otherwise exist
to transfer claims to confiscated property to U.S. nationals in order to take
advantage of the remedy created by this section.’” 272 On August 6, 2020,
Garcia-Bengochea appealed the court’s decision to the US Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit—making this one of the first Helms-Burton Act
cases to move on to the appellate level. 273 As of January 7, 2022, the court
has heard oral arguments, but has not issued a decision.
Garcia-Bengochea brought nearly identical lawsuits against NCL 274
and Royal Caribbean on August 27, 2019.275 Defendant NCL filed a motion
to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to adequately allege ownership of the property and to adequately plead unlawful intent, as well as the Act’s violation
of the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. 276 On August 25, 2020, the
court denied the motion, holding: (1) NCL’s constitutional arguments were
premature; (2) for reasons explained in the court’s August 26, 2019 Order
in Carnival, plaintiff adequately alleged an ownership claim; and (3) plain270. Id. at *3. More specifically, the court found that “the competing affidavits create
a conflict regarding reliability of experts and the issues of Costa Rican law raised by Carnival.” Id.
271. Id. at *4.
272. Garcia-Bengochea, 2020 WL 4590825 at *4 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-468,
at 52 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 1996 WL 90487).
273. Notice of Appeal, Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-12960 (11th Cir.
Aug. 6, 2020).
274. Complaint, Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No.
1:19-cv-23593 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2019).
275. Complaint, Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv23592 (S.D. Fla. Aug 27, 2019). Royal Caribbean filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 4, 2020, based on the date of plaintiff’s acquisition of the claim. Following
its Carnival decision, the court similarly found that the action is barred under §
6082(a)(4)(B), and it granted defendant’s motion. Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23592, 2020 WL 6081658, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2020). Garcia-Bengochea filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit on November 11, 2020. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated Garcia-Bengochea’s appeals in Carnival and Royal Caribbean for
merits disposition after briefing was completed. Order, Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 20-14251-BB (11th Cir. Mar. 17, 2021). As in Carnival, the Eleventh
Circuit has not issued a decision as of January 7, 2022.
276. Norwegian’s Motion to Dismiss, Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23593 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2019); Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23593, 2020 WL 5028209 at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 25, 2020).
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tiff need not allege specific facts showing NCL’s state of mind during its
alleged “trafficking” in the confiscated property. 277 Given that the court’s
order in Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp. is on appeal, NCL and Garcia-Bengochea filed a joint motion to stay and administratively close the
case, since “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the Carnival appeal will
significantly impact, if not outright determine, whether Plaintiff may pursue
this case against [NCL].”278 The court granted the joint motion, and the case
remains closed as of January 7, 2022.279
3.

Mata v. Expedia, Inc.

Shortly after the suspension of Title III was lifted, a group of heirs to
various hotel properties in Cuba brought a number of class action lawsuits
against a variety of foreign defendants including Cuban companies, European hotel chains, and European travel companies. 280 The plaintiffs in these
class actions were still facing complications related to serving the foreign
defendants six months after filing their complaints. Accordingly, one of the
six cases, Mata v. Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe, against a number of agencies and instrumentalities of the Cuban government was voluntarily dismissed. 281
In Mata v. Trivago GmbH, the plaintiffs’ difficulty in accomplishing
service of process led to an administrative order that stayed the case “pend-

277. Garcia-Bengochea, 2020 WL 5028209, at *2-3. Plaintiff points to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b), which provides that “intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person’s mind may be alleged generally,” and cites to Eleventh Circuit case law confirming
that Rule 9(b) does not require specific facts related to a defendant’s state of mind. Id. at *2.
The element of scienter, which refers to the mental state a person must possess before he can
be held legally responsible for his actions, is a reoccurring issue in Title III litigation.
278. Joint Motion to Stay and Administratively Close this Case at 1, GarciaBengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23593 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31,
2020).
279. Order Granting Joint Motion to Stay, Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise
Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23593 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2020).
280. Class Action Complaint for Damages, Mata v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19-cv22529 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2019); Class Action Complaint for Damages, Del Valle v. Trivago
GmbH, No. 1:19-cv-22619 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2019); Class Action Complaint for Damages,
Echevarria v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19-cv-22620 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2019); Class Action
Complaint for Damages, Echevarria v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19-cv-22621 (S.D. Fla. June
24, 2019); Class Action Complaint for Damages, Trinidad v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19-cv22629 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2019); Class Action Complaint for Damages, Mata v. Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe, No. 1:19-cv- 22025 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2019) (voluntarily dismissed on
Sept. 12, 2019).
281. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Mata v. Grupo Hotelero Gran
Caribe, No. 1:19-cv-22025 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2019).
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ing perfection of service on foreign Defendants.”282 A month and a half
later, plaintiffs filed a status report regarding service on foreign defendants
to
advise the Court that despite making diligent efforts to do so, they have not yet successfully served
Defendants Meliá Hotels International, S.A. (“Meliá”), and Trivago GmbH (“Trivago”). Both Spain
(where Meliá is located) and Germany (where
Trivago is located) have refused to execute requests for service under the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents (the “Hague Convention”). Meliá also
refused to accept service by postal channels under
Article 10 of the Hague Convention. Given the delay that Spain and Germany’s refusal to execute the
Hague service requests has caused, and in an effort
to streamline and simplify this action, the Putative
Class Representatives filed on December 6, 2019,
contemporaneously with this report, an Unopposed
Motion for Leave to Amend in which they request
leave to file the Second Amended Class-Action
Complaint which removes 36 of the 39 named
plaintiffs and 8 of the 15 defendants, including
both Meliá and Trivago.283
Subsequently, the group of heirs filed a second amended complaint,
suing seven new defendants—six of which were US companies.284 In this
renamed lawsuit of Mata v. Expedia, Inc., the plaintiffs, none of whom
have certified claims, alleged that the Expedia Entities and the Booking.com Entities have knowingly and intentionally benefited from their
confiscated hotel properties by providing online booking services for the
282. Order Administratively Closing Case, Mata v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19-cv22529 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2019).
283. Status Report Regarding Service on Foreign Defendants at 2, Mata v. Trivago
GmbH, No. 1:19-cv-22529 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2019).
284. Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages at ¶¶ 4-10, Mata v.
Expedia, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-22529 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2019). The defendants are now Expedia,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, Hotels.com L.P., a Texas limited partnership, Hotels.com GP,
LLC, a Texas limited liability company, Orbitz, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
and Travelocity.com LP, a Delaware limited partnership (collectively, the “Expedia Entities”); and Booking Holdings Inc., a Delaware corporation along with Booking.com B.V., a
Dutch limited liability company (collectively, the “Booking.com Entities”). Note that plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of defendant Travelocity.com, LP on Dec. 23,
2019.
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hotels, in violation of Title III.285 The defendants filed a joint motion to
dismiss, bringing what have become reoccurring arguments in Title III litigation to the court’s attention—namely, that the court lacks jurisdiction to
hear the case and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief. 286
More specifically, defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to allege a
prima facie case of specific jurisdiction (one of the two types of personal
jurisdiction recognized by the Supreme Court),287 because their alleged
conduct does not comport with Florida’s long-arm statute, which allows
Florida courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation. 288 To support their assertion, defendants referenced case law that holds
that maintaining a website accessible in Florida (the only fact alleged to
show that defendants are engaging in business in Florida) is insufficient to
satisfy Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) of the long-arm statute.289 Next, defendants
argued that plaintiffs alleged only economic injuries, while Section
48.193(1)(a)(6) of the statute necessitates personal injury or property damage in the State of Florida resulting from a defendant’s out-of-state actions. 290 Defendants also argued that there is no nexus between the cause of
285. Id. ¶¶ 34, 40, 63-70.
286. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 1-2, Mata v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1:19-cv22529 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2019).
287. Id. at 7; For the Supreme Court’s latest analysis on personal jurisdiction, see
generally, Anthony R. McClure, There’s No Place Like Home—To Establish Personal Jurisdiction, ABA (Sept. 1, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featuredarticles/2018/theres-no-place-home-establish-personal-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/K3XUSYKA]. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a defendant corporation if the corporation is “at home” in the forum state, meaning that the forum state is the corporation’s state
of incorporation and where it maintains its principal place of business. Specific personal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, arises out of the link between the underlying controversy and
the forum state.
288. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 286, at 7. The sections of the
Florida long arm statute at issue in Helms-Burton Act suits in this forum are: FL ST §§
48.193(1)(a)(1), 48.193(1)(a)(2), 48.193(1)(a)(6), 48.193(2) (2016). A defendant is subject
to specific personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)(1) if it is “[o]perating, conducting,
engaging in, or carrying on a business venture in [Florida] or having an office or agency in
[Florida].” A defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)(2) if
it is “[c]ommitting a tortious act within [Florida].” A defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)(6) if it is “[c]ausing injury to persons or property within
[Florida] arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside of [Florida], if, at or
about the time of the injury . . . [t]he defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within [Florida].” Finally, a defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction under §
48.193(2) if it is “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida], whether
such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise . . . whether or not the claim arises
from that activity.”
289. Defendant’s Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 286, at 7-8.
290. Id. at 7.
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action at issue and defendants’ alleged conduct, stating “[a]ssuming arguendo that merely offering reservations at the Subject Hotels constitutes
trafficking under Title III, the fact that residents in Florida (like those in
every other state) could make such reservations is hardly essential to plaintiffs’ cause of action.”291 Finally, defendants argued that the court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction would not comport with the Due Process Clause,
which requires a showing that defendants’ contacts with Florida relate to or
give rise to plaintiffs’ cause of action. Maintaining that no such showing
was made, defendants stated: “That Florida residents were among those that
could book reservations on defendants’ web-based platforms is not a but-for
cause of plaintiffs’ cause of action.” 292
Defendants also asserted that plaintiffs do not have constitutional
standing to maintain their suit. Citing the fairly recent Supreme Court decision in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, defendants maintained that plaintiffs lack
standing under Article III of the US Constitution because “Congress cannot
erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” 293 Here, defendants asserted that plaintiffs do not meet the first two elements of standing (a
concrete injury fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant) because
“Plaintiffs fail to plead any facts demonstrating that they own any right to
the Subject Hotels”294 and that “Defendants ‘played no role’ in bringing
about plaintiff’s alleged injury” because “that alleged injury occurred at
least fifty years before defendants’ alleged conduct (decades before defendants even came into existence), and was caused by the Cuban government.”295
Lastly, defendants argued that (1) “beyond conclusory allegations in
footnotes describing the plaintiffs as ‘heirs’ to the hotels, the complaint
contains no allegations that the named plaintiffs owned property interests in
the Subject Hotels whatsoever;”296 and (2) plaintiffs “fail to allege that they
acquired ownership of their claims before the Act’s enactment date . . . and,
therefore, ‘may not bring an action’ under Title III.” 297 In addition, defendants contended that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the element of
“trafficking,” presenting a two-fold argument: (1) plaintiffs did not allege
any facts that could support a reasonable inference that that defendants acted knowingly and intentionally, as required by the Act; and (2) the Act
clearly states that conduct incident to lawful travel does not constitute traf291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Defendant’s Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 286, at 9-10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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ficking, thereby requiring plaintiffs to allege conduct that falls outside of
the lawful travel exception.298
On December 26, 2019, the court denied defendants’ joint motion to
dismiss without prejudice and granted in part their joint motion to stay discovery, stating: “While the Court understands Defendants are challenging
the Second Amended Complaint’s jurisdictional allegations, jurisdictional
discovery will be permitted. Merits discovery is stayed.”299 Jurisdictional
discovery proceeded in early 2020; however, on March 13, 2020, the court
entered an administrative order closing the case after all parties filed a joint
motion seeking a continuance of discovery deadlines “because of Coronavirus-related travel restrictions, closure of the Booking Defendants’ offices,
the Booking Defendants’ inability to meet with and prepare their designated
Rule 30(b)(6) representatives for their depositions, and Plaintiffs’ inability
to take those depositions.”300 As of January 7, 2022, the case has not proceeded further.
4.

Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH

Another set of heirs to Cuban beachfront property filed a class action
in June 2019;301 yet, they too ran into what are becoming familiar roadblocks to surviving the motion to dismiss stage. In Del Valle v. Trivago
GmbH, the Del Valle family and the Falla family each allege that they
owned several parcels of land in the province of Matanza, Cuba, while the
Angulo Cuevas family allegedly owned the entirety of the island Cayo Coco. 302 By plaintiffs’ filing of the second amended complaint, plaintiff Cuevas was replaced with Angelo Pou, whose family allegedly owned two
thousand acres of beachfront land, also in the province of Matanza.303 The
plaintiff heirs were not US citizens at the time of the confiscations and
were, therefore, not eligible to certify their claims with the FCSC.304
298. Id. at 13-15. Defendants recognized that two other judges in the same court
declined to dismiss plaintiffs’ lawsuits based on their failure to allege conduct outside of the
law travel exception but reminded the court that it is not bound by those rulings. Defendant’s
Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 286, at 15.
299. Order at 1, Mata v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-22529 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 26, 2019).
300. Administrative Order Closing Case at 1, Mata v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1:19-cv22529 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2020). Note that this order closes the case for “statistical purposes
only . . . . The Court nonetheless retains jurisdiction, and the case shall be restored to the
active docket upon court order following motion of a party advising all parties are ready to
proceed.” Id.
301. Class Action Complaint for Damages, Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19cv-22619 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2019).
302. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
303. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 28-33, Del Valle v. Trivago
GmbH, No. 1:19-cv-22619 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2020).
304. Id. ¶ 46.
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As in Mata v. Expedia, Inc., and a number of other pending class actions, the plaintiffs filed their suit against a mix of Cuban agencies, members of the Cuban government, and foreign companies—they did not name
a single US defendant.305 Clearly facing similar service of process issues as
those detailed above in Mata, the representative plaintiffs in Del Valle filed
an amended complaint naming a new set of defendants—all but one were
US entities.306 In their second amended class action complaint, the plaintiff
heirs detailed how their families’ properties were confiscated by the Cuban
government and developed into hotel resorts.307 Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants, designated as the “Expedia Entities” and the “Booking.com
Entities,” are “directly benefitting from the Trafficked Hotels by receiving
commissions or other fees for the booking of the Trafficked Hotels” and
“also derive an indirect benefit from the Trafficked Hotels by receiving
advertising revenues driven by or related to their offering of the Trafficked
Hotels.”308 This, according to plaintiffs, qualifies as knowing and intentional trafficking of their property under the Act. 309
The Expedia Entities and the Booking.com Entities filed separate motions to dismiss on April 10, 2020, and unsurprisingly, attacked plaintiffs’
statement of the claim and the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 310 Unlike in Mata v. Expedia, Inc., however, the court did not
permit plaintiffs to engage in jurisdictional discovery, and it granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. 311 In its opinion, the court analyzed only the

305. Id. ¶¶ 13-18. In addition to the Cuban parties, the Plaintiffs named Trivago
GmbH, a German limited liability company headquartered in Dusseldorf, Germany and
Booking.com B.V. a Dutch limited liability company based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands,
as Defendants. Id.
306. Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages, Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH,
No. 1:19-cv-22619 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2019). As in Mata, the defendants are now Expedia,
Inc., a Delaware corporation; Hotels.com L.P., a Texas limited partnership; Hotels.com GP,
LLC, a Texas limited liability company; Orbitz, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
(collectively, the “Expedia Entities”) and Booking Holdings Inc., a Delaware corporation
along with Booking.com B.V., a Dutch limited liability company (collectively, the “Booking.com entities”).
307. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 303, ¶¶ 19-39.
308. Id. ¶¶ 49-51, 57-59.
309. Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
310. See Defendants Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.Com L.P., Hotels.Com GP, and
Orbitz, LLC’s Motion To Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, No. 19-cv-22619 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2020), and
Defendants Booking Holdings Inc. and Booking.Com B.V.’s Motion To Dismiss The
Amended Class Action Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, Del Valle v.
Trivago GmbH, No. 19-cv-22619 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2020).
311. Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, No. 19-cv-22619, 2020 WL 2733729, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. May 26, 2020).

2021]

THE HELMS-BURTON ACT BACKFIRES

55

personal jurisdiction arguments posed by each side, ultimately holding that
plaintiffs failed to establish that the court has jurisdiction to hear the case. 312
Relying on Florida’s long-arm statute, the plaintiffs argued that by soliciting and accepting reservations from Florida residents for resorts on the
confiscated property, defendants subjected themselves to Florida’s jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1).313 The court held that this level of activity did not amount to “carrying on a business venture” in Florida as required by the statute.314 To this end, the court found plaintiffs’ complaint
lacking in facts that could establish “a general course of business activity in
the state for pecuniary benefit.”315 The law demands the presence and operation of a Florida office, the possession of a Florida business license, or
facts relating to the number of Florida residents served and the percentage
of revenue derived from Florida residents. 316 The court also reiterated previous holdings, which establish that “merely having a website accessible in
Florida is not sufficient” to support specific personal jurisdiction. 317 Additionally, plaintiffs asserted presence of specific jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) by arguing that a tort was committed in Florida because plaintiffs reside in Florida and because the defendants’ websites,
through which they rented the hotel properties, are accessible in Florida. 318
The court, however, declined to find that it has jurisdiction under this subsection of the long-arm statute because plaintiffs did not cite to any analogous case law to support their argument.319 Finally, plaintiffs argued the
existence of general jurisdiction under Section 48.193(2), which the court
also rejected because “Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants run a website
that is accessible in Florida falls woefully short of the required allegations
to establish ‘substantial and not isolated activity within this state.’” 320
While the court did not address this argument in its opinion, both sets
of defendants also maintained that the action should be dismissed because
plaintiffs failed to state a claim. First, defendants stated that plaintiffs Pou
and Falla failed to plead ownership to an actionable claim under Title III
because they inherited their interest in the property after March 12, 1996—

312. Id. at *1-4. Plaintiffs argued that the court has specific jurisdiction under FL ST
§ 48.193(1)(a)(1) and § 48.193(1)(a)(2), and general jurisdiction under § 48.193(1), Florida’s long arm statute.
313. Id. at *2. See supra note 288 for details on Florida’s long arm statute.
314. Id. (quoting § 48.193(1)(a)).
315. Id.
316. Del Valle, 2020 WL 2733729 at *2.
317. Id. at *3.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at *2-3.
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the cutoff date established by Section 6082(a)(4)(B) of the Act. 321 Del Valle
alleged that the interest in the property was “distributed to” his father’s
children, but defendants argued that he failed to “allege any facts from
which one could conclude that he actually inherited anything at all.” 322 Second, defendants argued that plaintiffs offered only conclusory allegations,
and no facts, when claiming that defendants knowingly and intentionally
trafficked in confiscated property.323 In addition, defendants maintained that
the “lawful travel” clause of Title III bars the plaintiffs’ claim, since offering hotel accommodations is incident to and necessary to the conduct of
travel to Cuba. Both sets of defendants have licenses which authorize the
entities to provide travel related services to US residents lawfully traveling
to Cuba,324 and plaintiffs, according to defendants, did not provide facts to
support the claim that defendants’ customers are traveling to the resorts for
“tourism” or any other unlawful purpose.325 Finally, the Expedia Entities
provided a third argument for plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim: The proper321. Booking.Com B.V.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 15; Expedia Group,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 13-14. In its opinion, the court states, in a footnote, that “it would be futile for Angelo Pou (and possibly for Enrique Falla) to amend their
complaint because they do not appear to have actionable ownership interests.” Del Valle,
2020 WL 2733729 at *5 n.2.
322. Expedia Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 13.
323. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs argue in their complaint that defendants acted knowingly and
intentionally because plaintiffs’ counsel sent them a letter indicating their intent to commence an action unless defendants ceased their trafficking. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 44 & Ex. A.).
The Expedia Entities responded to this stating:
As an initial matter, receiving a letter from a plaintiff’s attorney containing unsubstantiated allegations about a claim to a particular property in
Cuba does not render any subsequent activity involving that property
‘knowing and intentional’ trafficking. But even assuming arguendo that
such a letter could render any subsequent activity regarding the identified property ‘knowing and intentional,’ the letters that Plaintiffs’ counsel sent do not even identify the hotels that the Expedia Entities were allegedly trafficking in. Further, the letters do not mention Pou at all,
much less the location of his property or the name of the hotel that allegedly sits on it. Thus, even under Plaintiffs’ own flawed construct, the letter[s] do not pass muster.
Expedia Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 15.
324. Id. at 17; Booking.Com B.V.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 20. 31
C.F.R. § 515.560(a) permits persons subject to US jurisdiction to travel to Cuba for a number of specifically enumerated activities, including family visits, official government business, professional research, religious activities, educational activities, public performances,
and humanitarian projects.
325. Expedia Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 16; Booking.Com
B.V.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 20. Both sets of defendants also make the
argument that OFAC regulations merely require travel service companies to obtain from
customers a certification that their travel to Cuba conforms to an authorized and lawful
travel category. Id.
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ties at issue do not comport with the definition of “property” under the
Act. 326 The definition expressly does not include properties used for residential purposes at the time they were confiscated, unless, as of March 12,
1996, they were the subject of a certified claim or were occupied by a Cuban official. 327 According to defendants, (1) plaintiffs’ allegations allowed
no inference other than that the properties were used for residential purposes; and (2) plaintiffs failed to plead either circumstance posed by the definition, which would allow residential property to qualify as “property” under
the Act.328 On June 24, 2020, plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Eleventh
Circuit.329 As of January 7, 2022, the court has heard oral arguments, but
has not issued a decision.
D.

SECOND WAVE OF LAWSUITS

1.

Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC

Following the first wave of lawsuits, Robert M. Glen kicked off the
second wave in early fall of 2019 by filing five cases against American
Airlines, Visa, Mastercard, and a variety of travel companies. 330 Glen alleged that he holds a claim to two beachfront properties (known as “Blancarena” and “Cotepen”) located in Varadero, Cuba, once belonging to his
family who fled Cuba after the revolution. 331 Since the Cuban government’s
expropriation of the properties, they have become the site of four separate
beachfront resorts—the Iberostar Tainos, the Meliá Las Antillas, the Blau
Varadero, and the Starfish Varadero. 332 Perhaps anticipating difficulties
associated with suing foreign defendants, Glen has not sued any of these
four resorts so far. Instead, he has focused his attention on American companies, as many other plaintiffs have. Glen alleged that each of the defendants has “trafficked” in his property by (1) facilitating bookings at these
326. Expedia Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 18-19.
327. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12)(B) (1996).
328. Expedia Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 310, at 18-19.
329. Notice of Appeal, Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, No. 20-12407 (11th Cir. June
24, 2020).
330. Complaint, Glen v. Expedia, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-1538 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26,
2019); Complaint, Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1809 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2019);
Complaint, Glen v. Travelscape LLC, No. 2:19-cv-1683 (D. Nev. Sept. 26, 2019); Complaint, Glen v. American Airlines, Inc. No. 1:19-cv-23994 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2019); Complaint, Glen v. Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1870 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2019). The TripAdvisor, Expedia, and other travel company entities sued by Glen are all US corporations, limited liability
companies, or limited partnerships. The Visa and Mastercard entities, along with American
Airlines, Inc. are all corporations chartered in Delaware.
331. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 3-4, 30-33, Glen v. Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1870 (D.
Del. Mar. 16, 2020).
332. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.
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hotels, (2) permitting the hotels to collect payment from their guests, and
(3) profiting from the hotels’ own trafficking. 333
Glen consolidated three of his cases against various Expedia affiliates
including but not limited to Expedia, Inc., TripAdvisor LLC, and Travelscape LLC (the “Expedia Defendants”), into one action in the US District
Court for the District of Delaware in exchange for the Expedia Defendants
agreeing to waive any jurisdictional defenses. 334 On December 7, 2020, the
court heard oral arguments on all pending motions, including defendants’
motion to dismiss.335 On March 30, 2021, Judge Leonard P. Stark issued
one ruling with respect to both TripAdvisor LLC and Visa, Inc., granting
defendants’ motions to dismiss.336 The court’s opinion is discussed below
following an analysis of Glen’s case against the Visa and Mastercard entities.
2.

Glen v. Visa Inc.

In Glen v. Visa Inc., Glen brought an action against Visa Inc., Visa
U.S.A. Inc., and Visa International (“Visa”) along with Mastercard Incorporated and Mastercard International Incorporated (“Mastercard,” together
with Visa, “defendants”). Glen alleged that
Defendants offer their network services to merchants in Cuba, including the beachfront resorts on
the properties confiscated from Glen’s family . . . .
333. Id. ¶¶ 6-10.
334. Stipulated Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice at 2, Glen v. Expedia, Inc., No.
2:19-cv-1538 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2019).
335. See Oral Order, Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1809 (D. Del. Oct. 28,
2020) (ordering that the court will hear all pending motions on December 7, 2020 for
TripAdvisor LLC and for Visa). In large part, Expedia Defendants’ arguments in their motions to dismiss mirror those made in the cases already discussed above. Defendants argue
that plaintiff (1) lacks Article III standing; (2) did not acquire the property claim before the
statutory bar date; (3) fails to allege that defendants acted “knowingly” and “intentionally;”
and that (5) defendants did not “traffic” in plaintiff’s property because their services are
“incident and necessary to lawful travel.” See Opening Brief of Defendants Kayak Software
Corp. and Booking Holdings Inc. in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1809 (D. Del. May 11, 2020); and
Defendants TripAdvisor LLC and TripAdvisor, Inc.’s Opening Brief in Support of their
Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv1809 (D. Del. May 11, 2020). One new argument is that Glen is barred from bringing the
action by the “election of remedies” clause of the Helms-Burton Act, described in further
detail in Subsection D.2. below. See Opening Brief of Defendants Kayak Software Corp. and
Booking Holdings Inc. at 6, Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1809 (D. Del. May 11,
2020).
336. Memorandum Op., Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1809 (D. Del. Mar.
30, 2021).
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[and] [b]y affirmatively permitting these hotels to
collect payment from their guests through [a] Visaor Mastercard-branded credit card (and by earning
revenue in connection with each such swipe), Defendants are engaging in commercial activity that
uses or otherwise benefits from Glen’s confiscated
property. 337
As required by the Act, Glen provided notice of his claims to the defendants. While Mastercard did not respond to the statutory notice, Visa did,
stating that it “has instructed its licensees that all Visa-branded cards cannot
be used at the [Subject Hotels] henceforth.”338 Despite Visa’s statement,
Glen maintains that “Visa remains liable for its prior trafficking in the Glen
Properties.”339
Visa and Mastercard filed separate motions to dismiss, each presenting
familiar arguments to the court. Defendants maintained that the action
should be dismissed because (1) Glen did not acquire his claim before the
statutory cutoff date of March 12, 1996; (2) the transactions defendants are
involved in are “incident to lawful travel”—an exception to the Act’s definition of “trafficking;” and (3) Glen failed to plausibly allege that defendants acted “knowingly” and “intentionally.” 340 However, some of the defendants’ arguments are peculiar to Glen’s case—namely that the action
should be dismissed (1) due to the existence of a prior action for damages
arising from the same claim, 341 and (2) because a Title III lawsuit cannot be
based on real property used for residential purposes (with some narrow
exceptions). 342
In 2004, Glen and his mother sued Club Méditerranée S.A., a French
travel and tourism operator that built a hotel on their former land, for trespass and unjust enrichment. 343 Visa argued that this prior suit triggers dismissal of Glen’s current action under the “election of remedies” provision
of the Helms-Burton Act,344 which states:
337. Amended Complaint, supra note 331, ¶¶ 8-9.
338. Id. ¶¶ 71-73 (citing Visa’s response).
339. Id. ¶ 74.
340. See Opening Brief in Support of Visa’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Glen v. Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1870 (D. Del. May 11, 2020); Defendants Mastercard
Inc. and Mastercard International Inc.’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, Glen v.
Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1870 (D. Del. May 11, 2020).
341. Visa’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 7-8.
342. Mastercard’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 1618.
343. Glen v. Club Méditerranée S.A., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
344. Visa’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 7-8.
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(B) any person who brings, under the common law
or any provision of law other than this section, a
civil action or proceeding for monetary or nonmonetary compensation arising out of a claim for
which an action would otherwise be cognizable
under this section may not bring an action under
this section on that claim. 345
Glen’s answer in opposition to this was that Club Méditerranée S.A. involved different property and different defendants—allegations that should
meet his obligation “to allege that he is entitled to relief and to negate (to
the extent it is even his burden) the election-of-remedies provision.”346
Next, in his amended complaint, Glen detailed the transfer of the property (which initially belonged to his great-grandfather) and referenced a
“rustic, one-room limestone cottage” built by his family on one of the two
tracts of land. 347 Mastercard latched onto this fact and argued that “Glen’s
suit cannot succeed, as the plain text of the Helms-Burton Act makes clear
that a Title III claim may not rest on real property used in this way.” 348
Glen, in turn, argued that Mastercard misread the Act, stating:
The residential purposes exception in the Act’s
definition of “property” bars a plaintiff from alleging that a defendant is trafficking by using real
property as a residence. That a portion of a property may have been historically used for residential
purposes is irrelevant. . . . The exclusion is meant
to prevent a flood of claims where the alleged trafficking is the modern-day, residential use of property by Cuban citizens, and not to bar Glen from
asserting a claim for Defendants trafficking in
properties that are the site of commercial hotel establishments.349
345. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(f)(1)(B) (1996).
346. Plaintiff Robert M. Glen’s Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 10-11, Glen v. Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv1870 (D. Del. June 30, 2020) (internal quotations omitted).
347. Amended Complaint, supra note 331, ¶¶ 30-42.
348. Mastercard’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 1617. Addressing the Act’s carveouts for eligible residential properties, Mastercard argued that
Glen’s claim does not fall into those exceptions because (1) his claim was not certified by
the FCSC, and (2) the property is not occupied by an official of the Cuban Government, as
provided in the Act’s definition. Id.
349. Plaintiff’s Omnibus Answering Brief, supra note 346, at 18-19 (citations and
emphasis omitted).
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Alternatively, Glen argued that even if Mastercard’s interpretation is correct, its argument still fails because the cottage was only on a small portion
of one of the two tracts of land, and Glen can still assert a claim for trafficking in connection with the remaining undeveloped portion of his family’s
land.350
Finally, the defendants also made two relatively unfamiliar arguments
for this category of litigation. First, Mastercard argued that the action
should be dismissed because Glen has not pleaded facts to show that the
property at issue has not been the subject of a claim certified by the FCSC,
as required by Section 6082(a)(5)(D) of the Act.351 More specifically, Mastercard maintained that Glen’s allegation that he was not eligible to have his
claim certified by the FCSC is insufficient and he must bear “the burden of
establishing for the court that the interest in property that is the subject of
the claim is not the subject of a claim so certified.” 352 In response, Glen
stated:
Considering that the claim to the Glen Properties
has been held by Glen or his family members since
confiscation, it is reasonable to infer from this allegation that the Glen Properties are not the subject
of a claim certified by the FCSC in the 1960s. In
any event, all claims adjudicated by the FCSC are
publicly available, and an index of such claims
published by the commission reflects that there are
no certified claims associated with . . . the Glen
Properties.353
Second, Visa argued that the Helms-Burton Act (or at least its civil
remedy provision) violates Visa’s constitutional rights because (1) the Act’s
definition of “traffics” is vague both facially and as Glen seeks to apply it to
Visa; and (2) the Act’s damages provision would impose “impermissibly
excessive, punitive and disproportionate remedies.” 354 Visa’s position was
that the Act did not give it “fair notice” that it might be subject to liability
for trafficking. This is because the definition of “traffics” states that transactions incident to “lawful travel” are not trafficking, thereby placing Visa’s services (facilitating bookings and permitting the hotels to collect payment from their guests) outside the realm of prohibited activity. 355 Visa also
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 19.
Mastercard’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 16.
Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(5)(D) (1996)).
Plaintiff’s Omnibus Answering Brief, supra note 346, at 28-29.
Visa’s Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 15-18.
Id. at 16.
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argued that the definition is impermissibly vague on its face because it prohibits engaging in “commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property . . . by another person, or . . . through another person.”356 Visa illustrated the predicament created by the definition:
If literally applied, this definition would encompass a virtually limitless number of actors. With respect to the hotels at issue in this case, it would encompass, not only the entities that own and operate
the hotels, but also, for example: a Swedish furniture maker, an Irish linen producer, a Canadian
farmer, or a U.S. paint manufacturer whose products, sold by international distributors rather than
directly to Cuba, wind up in one of the hotels in
question (or in any other hotels or commercial entities in Cuba located on confiscated property). Each
would have profited “by” or “through” others (one
or more independent distributors) from the sale of
its products or services ultimately paid for and used
by the hotels. 357
Visa lastly addressed the damages provision of the Helms-Burton Act,
which it argued violates its constitutional due process rights for a few main
reasons: (1) damages under the Act are not based on any profit Visa might
have obtained, but on the entire value of Glen’s property at the time of confiscation plus 60 years of interest; (2) the Act does not require multiple traffickers to make a contribution toward an award of damages—a plaintiff
could potentially recover the entire value of its property from a string of
traffickers who each profit from the property in some way; and (3) the Act
provides for treble damages along with attorneys’ fees and court costs.358
The court dismissed both TripAdvisor LLC and Visa Inc. 359 First, the
court found that Glen was not precluded from relitigating the issues that had
already been decided in American Airlines.360 It further held that it would
356. Id. at 17 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(ii)-(iii)).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 18-19. On December 7, 2020, Judge Stark heard oral arguments on the
motion in the Visa case as well. Glen v. Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1870.
359. Memorandum Op., Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1809 (D. Del. Mar.
30, 2021); Memorandum Op., Visa Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1870 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2021).
360. Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 7. The court requested that both sides file
letter briefs addressing the impact, if any, of the US District Court for the Northern District
of Texas’s decision in Glen v. American Airlines, Inc. to dismiss Glen’s claim. Id. at 6.
Glen’s case against American Airlines is discussed below in Subsection D.3.
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not dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Glen
had met his burden of establishing Article III standing. 361 The court reasoned that Glen’s harm satisfies standing requirements because, while it
may be “intangible,” it is nevertheless “concrete,” since Congress expressed
its intent to make the injury redressable by enacting the Helms-Burton
Act. 362 The court further found that (1) the particularity and actuality requirements are both satisfied; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to defendants’
conduct because Congress did not intend for the casual link to stop at the
Cuban government’s confiscation; and (3) the injury can be redressed by a
favorable judgment.363
Despite these wins for the plaintiff, the court ultimately dismissed the
suit for failure to state a claim because Glen failed to allege that (1) he acquired the claim prior to March 12, 1996, and (2) defendants knowingly and
intentionally trafficked in the subject properties. 364 Glen urged the court “to
read the word ‘acquire’ as meaning ‘to get by one’s own efforts,’ which
would result in the statutory term ‘acquire’ not including ‘passively inherit[ing] the claim.’”365 The court did not adopt Glen’s proposed interpretation—first, it did not believe that the term is ambiguous, and second, it relied on a published notice by the US Department of Justice summarizing the
provisions of Title III, which stated that “if the property was confiscated
before March 12, 1996, the US national bringing the claim must have
owned the claim before March 12, 1996.”366 The court reasoned that “the
word ‘own’ is not limited to ‘by one’s effort,’ as Glen suggested, but is,
instead, sufficiently broad to cover ownership by inheritance.”367 To come
to its decision, the court also delved into surrounding statutory language,
legislative history, and conceivable justifications such as judicial economy
for the date-of-acquisition requirement. 368
With respect to the element of scienter, the court came to three conclusions. First, it held that it is not enough for defendants to merely knowingly
and intentionally engage in commercial activities—they must know that the
properties at issue were confiscated. 369 Second, having “reason to know”
that the properties were confiscated because it is a well-known fact that the
Castro Regime expropriated property following the Cuban Revolution does

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 14.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 20.
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not satisfy the requisite scienter under the Act.370 And third, with respect to
the post-notice period only, Glen “plausibly alleged scienter against all
Defendants other than Visa . . . because Visa Defendants promptly ceased
their commercial activities in connection with the Subject Hotels upon receiving the notice.”371 Having concluded that Glen’s action is barred because he did not timely acquire his claim and because he failed to allege
scienter (at least with respect to Visa), the court did not address any of the
other arguments brought by the defendants and discussed in this Article. 372
On April 27, 2021, Glen filed appeals for both TripAdvisor LLC, and Visa
Inc. with the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. As of January 7,
2022, the court has not issued a decision for either case.
3.

Glen v. American Airlines, Inc.

Initially filed in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Glen v. American Airlines, Inc. was transferred to the US District Court
for the Northern District of Texas.373 In its complaint against American
Airlines, Glen alleged that not only does the airline operate daily flights
from Miami International Airport to Cuba, but it also facilitates hotel bookings for passengers’ stay in Cuba through its website—including bookings
for the four beachfront resorts now on Glen’s confiscated property. 374 Glen
argued that by facilitating these bookings, American Airlines is itself engaging in a commercial activity that benefits from the confiscated property,
and is participating and profiting from the resorts’ own trafficking. 375 The
parties proceeded to file a series of briefs culminating in the court’s dismissal of the action. 376
American Airlines argued that Glen’s complaint should be dismissed
because Glen (1) lacks Article III standing, (2) did not acquire his claim
before the statutory cutoff date, and (3) failed to adequately plead that defendant acted intentionally and knowingly. 377 On August 3, 2020, the court

370. Id. at 21.
371. Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 22.
372. Id. at 23.
373. Order, Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23994 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2020)
(transferring action to the Northern District of Texas).
374. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 7-9, Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23994
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2020).
375. Id. ¶¶ 9-12. Glen alleges in his complaint that between January 23, 2018, and
July 19, 2019, visitors of American Airlines’ website made twenty-four reservations at the
resorts, earning the airline commissions for each reservation made. Id. ¶¶ 145-148.
376. See Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00482, 2020 WL 4464665, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020).
377. Id.
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agreed with American Airlines, holding that Glen indeed (1) lacks standing
to sue, and (2) failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 378
Glen conceded that neither the Cuban government’s confiscation of
the properties nor the hotels’ operations constituted injuries-in-fact; instead,
he based his injury entirely on the airline’s alleged violation of the substantive right given to claimants by the Act. 379 The court’s position on this argument is unequivocal:
Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue
to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing. Plaintiff complains that defendant fails to
compensate plaintiff when defendant earns commissions on reservations made at the Subject Hotels. It is unclear how plaintiff is injured by such an
action. Defendant did not deprive plaintiff of the
Properties or the profits he might make if he owned
and operated hotels on the Properties. Instead, defendant merely does business with the Subject Hotels. . . . [P]laintiff would not be entitled to a portion of defendant’s commissions even if he owned
the Properties and operated the Subject Hotels. 380
Standing aside, the court also based its holding on its finding that Glen
failed to plead sufficient facts to prove the element of scienter required by
Title III of the Act, which (according to the court) requires a showing that
American Airlines knew that the resorts were constructed on confiscated
property and intended to traffic in that confiscated property. 381 Glen maintained that “a defendant need not have realized that property was confiscated in order for the listed activity involving such property to constitute ‘trafficking’ under the Act.”382 The court disagreed with this interpretation, reasoning that:
378. Id. at *2.
379. Id.
380. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Ultimately, the court held that
Glen failed to plead that he suffered a concrete injury and disagreed that the Supreme Court
limited the concrete harm requirement to actions related to the violation of procedural requirements in Spokeo. Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *3.
381. Id. at *1.
382. Id. at *5. Glen’s position is that “knowingly and intentionally” modify only the
verbs found in the definition of “traffics” (i.e. sells, transfers, purchases, possesses, acquires,
engages, participates, profits, etc.), and not the language of “confiscated property.” The court
rejects this argument relying on the Supreme Court case United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
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plaintiff does not explain how someone might sell,
buy, or engage in some other commercial activity
without knowing that he is doing so or intending to
do so. It seems that to engage in any of the actions
listed in § 6023(13)(A), the actor must at least be
aware of his own actions.383
According to the court, Glen’s interpretation of the provision would render
the “knowingly and intentionally” language “superfluous.”384 Additionally,
the court addressed Glen’s argument that American Airlines had (1) “reason
to know” that real property belonging to US nationals was confiscated by
the Cuban government due to Congress’s inclusion of this finding in the
Act, and (2) gained actual knowledge of the confiscation after Glen sent a
cease and desist notice prior to filing his action.385 The court, again, disagreed with this position, reasoning that if the Act was meant to place all
potential defendants on notice, Congress would not have included the word
“knowingly” in the definition of “traffics.”386 Additionally, the court found
that Glen did not plead facts to show that American Airlines continued to
facilitate bookings to the resorts after receiving the cease and desist notice. 387
Lastly, the court held that Glen is not eligible to bring a suit under the
Helms-Burton Act because, according to his pleadings, he inherited his
claim to the properties in 1999 and 2001. 388 As discussed above in other
case analyses, the Act provides that, for property confiscated before March
12, 1996, a US national may not bring a Title III unless such national acquires ownership to the claim before March 12, 1996.389 While Glen argued
that the term “acquires” in the provision should not be read to include inheritance (meaning that the Act would not bar actions related to inherited
claims after the cutoff date), the court disagreed, reasoning:
If the Act’s definition of ‘acquires’ does not include inheritance, plaintiff never ‘acquire[d] ownership of the claim’ and therefore ‘may not bring
383. Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *6.
384. Id. The court also states that it “is not alone in its interpretation of the breadth of
the scienter element,” referring to the decision in Gonzalez v. Amazon, Inc., No. 19-23988,
2020 WL 1169125, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2020). Gonzalez is discussed in Section IV.E.1.
385. Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *6.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at *4.
389. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B) (1996).
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an action’ under the Act. If the Act’s definition of
‘acquires’ does include inheritance, plaintiff did
acquire his claim to the Properties, but not until after the March 12, 1996 deadline. 390
Glen appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit on August 28, 2020.391 On August 2, 2021, the Fifth Circuit vacated
the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing, but ultimately rendered a
decision for American Airlines.392 The court disagreed with Glen’s assertion that Section 6082(a)(4)(B) does not apply to inheritance. The Fifth
Circuit explained that “[i]f Congress meant for ‘acquires’ to require some
form of active conduct, like a purchase, it knew how to communicate that
meaning.”393 It specifically pointed to Section 6082(a)(4)(C), which prohibits a Title III claim for property confiscated on or after March 12, 1996, if
the US national “acquires ownership of a claim to the property by assignment for value,” after the confiscation, reasoning that “[t]here would have
been no reason for Congress to add the words ‘by assignment for value’ if
‘acquires ownership’ was already limited to assignment for value.”394
The Fifth Circuit made no mention of the amicus curiae brief of former Congressmen Dan Burton and Robert Torricelli filed in support of
Glen’s argument on this issue. 395 In their brief, the Congressmen explain
their stance:
Today, approximately 85% of all certified claims
are owned by individuals who inherited their
claims from relatives whose property was confiscated by the Castro government prior to March 12,
1996. To accept the proposition that claims inherited after March 12, 1996, are unenforceable would
effectively render the law meaningless. It would
have made no sense for Congress to establish in the
Helms-Burton Act such a compensatory and deterrent remedy in 1996 for confiscations that arose
two generations earlier, which law also included
390. Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *4.
391. Notice of Appeal, Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00482 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 28, 2020).
392. Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2021).
393. Id. at 336 (emphasis omitted).
394. Id. (citing § 6082(a)(4)(C)) (internal citations omitted).
395. Brief of Former Congressmen Dan Burton and Robert Torricelli as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant and Reversal, Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 20-10903 (5th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2020).
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the ability of the President to suspend the right to
bring a lawsuit, and then say that Congress did not
intend the remedy to be available to the heirs who
inherited the claim 40+ years after the confiscation.
Such a result would be completely incompatible
with Congress’s purpose and actions. 396
According to Congressmen Burton and Torricelli,
[the] provision was specifically enacted to disallow
the acquisition of claims by purchase or trade in a
secondary market for claims. This was made clear
in the House Legislative Report, which confirms
that both sections 6082(4)(B) and 6082(4)(C) were
intended to eliminate any incentive that otherwise
might exist to transfer claims to U.S. nationals to
take advantage of the remedy created by this section . . . . Congress did not want to create a marketplace for the buying and selling of Title III claims.
A claim inherited from a family member was never
at issue.397
Many Title III plaintiffs were undoubtedly eagerly anticipating the
Fifth Circuit’s decision given this amicus curiae submission; however, it
appears the court did not place much importance on the arguments made by
the Congressmen. It remains unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit will be
influenced by the Congressmen’s submission in the Garcia-Bengochea
appeals.
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate judgment for American Airlines, it
ruled in favor of Glen on the key legal issue of standing. American Airlines
argued that (1) Glen does not have a legally protected interest in the properties because they were confiscated years earlier, meaning that Glen’s relatives had nothing to pass down to him upon their deaths; and (2) Glen’s
injury is not traceable to American Airline’s actions, which resulted in a
total of $503.18 in commissions.398 With respect to the first point, the court
explained that “American’s argument goes to the merits of Glen’s claim,
not his standing.”399 Glen had standing because his complaint alleged an
interest in the properties, which is sufficient to meet the minimum Article
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 9-10.
Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 335.
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III requirements. 400 The Court also relied on the Act’s abrogation of the act
of state doctrine, which specifically provides that no US court will decline
to make a determination on the merits of a Title III action based on the doctrine.401 The Fifth Circuit ultimately refused to assume the validity of the
Cuban expropriations—an assumption that would impact the existence of
Glen’s interest in the properties. 402 With respect to the second point, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that Glen “alleges an injury that is entirely separate
from either the confiscation of the properties or the operation of hotels on
those properties. Specifically, he alleges that American was unjustly enriched because it did business with the entities that now occupy the properties that were wrongly taken from him.” 403
On December 15, 2021, Glen filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,
leaving the door open (as of this writing) for a potential Supreme Court
hearing on “[w]hether the word ‘acquires’ within the context of the Act
embraces a broad or narrow meaning.”404
E.

THIRD WAVE OF LAWSUITS

The preceding cases reveal one of many patterns—a large number of
the defendants that are part of the novel Helms-Burton Act litigation are
travel related entities that have little direct connection to the expropriated
properties in question. Two lawsuits that steer away from this pattern are
Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc. and Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard.

400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 336.
404. Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Dec. 15, 2021) (No. 21-903); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (U.S. Dec. 15, 2021) (No. 21-903). Glen argues that the Court should grant review
for the following reasons:
First, this petition raises a fundamental legal question of statutory interpretation that is recurring in the lower courts and in
an area of exceptional national importance. Second, absent review, the decision below effectively precludes individual victims of the Castro regime from taking advantage of the express
private right of action endowed to them by Congress. Third,
Title III of the Act sets forth the express foreign policy of the
United States toward Cuba. The decision below undermines
this stated policy and contravenes Congress’s clear intent.
Id. at 12.
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Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc.

Plaintiff Daniel A. Gonzalez’s grandfather purchased approximately
2,030 acres of agricultural land in Cuba in 1941 that was confiscated by the
Cuban government in 1964.405 At that time, Gonzalez could not file a claim
with the FCSC because he was not a US citizen. 406 In his complaint, Gonzalez alleged that the interest in the land passed to him by operation of succession.407 He further alleged that starting January 5, 2017, Amazon.com,
Inc. and Susshi International Inc. knowingly and intentionally trafficked in
the property by marketing and selling marabu charcoal produced on the
confiscated land without his authorization.408
Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, and on March 11, 2020, the
US District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted those motions, holding that Gonzalez did not sufficiently allege that (1) he has an
actionable ownership interest in the property, and (2) the defendants knowingly and intentionally trafficked in the property. 409 With respect to the element of scienter, the court held that plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory
and that, “Gonzalez’s assertion that the charcoal advertisement on Amazon,
which states that it is ‘Direct from Farmers in Cuba,’ demonstrates the Defendants’ knowledge, is mistaken.410 That the charcoal is produced by Cuban farmers does not demonstrate that the Defendants knew the property
was confiscated by the Cuban government nor that it was owned by a United States citizen.”411
The court allowed Gonzalez to file an amended complaint to correct
the deficiencies indicated in its opinion; however, after another round of
briefings, the court again granted defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice, holding that Gonzalez still had not alleged that he has an actionable
ownership interest in the property—a dispositive issue. 412 The amended
complaint illuminates certain details about the succession of the property
interest. Gonzalez’s grandfather passed away in 1988 and, upon his death,

405. Complaint at ¶¶ 9-11, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23988, (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 26, 2019).
406. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
407. Id. ¶ 9.
408. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Amazon.com, Inc. is a Delaware corporation and Susshi International, Inc., d/b/a Fogo Charcoal is a Florida corporation.
409. Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23988, 2020 WL 1169125 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 11, 2020).
410. Id. at *2.
411. Id.
412. Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23988, 2020 WL 2323032 (S.D.
Fla. May 11, 2020).
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the subject property passed to Gonzalez’s father. 413 After his father’s death
in 2016, Gonzalez’s mother, Adis Gonzalez, inherited the property, but she
chose to pass her ownership claim to her son. 414 According to the court,
these facts did not indicate that Gonzalez inherited the property before
March 12, 1996, the claims acquisition deadline. 415 Due to this missing
critical element, the court held that Gonzalez failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, declaring that because he had two opportunities
to state a claim and has failed to do so, any further amendment would be
futile. 416
Gonzalez filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit, pro se, on June 9,
2020. In his brief, Gonzalez argued that his “right of future ownership and
interest” in the claim was established in 1988 when his grandfather passed
away.417 He further argued that, had the Helms-Burton Act not been suspended for 23 years, his father would have had the opportunity to timely
pursue his legal rights.418 Accordingly, Gonzalez’s position (and that of
many other non-corporate Title III plaintiffs) is that heirs who inherited
their claims after the acquisitions deadline should be permitted to bring an
action under Title III.419 To support his position, Gonzalez referenced the
amicus brief of former Congressmen Dan Burton and Robert Torricelli filed
in Glen v. American Airlines, Inc.420 In this brief, the amici state that “there
is no question that Congress intended that heirs should enjoy the right to
sue under Title III even if they inherited their claims after March 12, 1996.
Any other interpretation would render the law meaningless . . . .”421 Despite
these arguments, on February 11, 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment stating, “[t]he language that Congress used in this
provision is clear and unambiguous. . . . [a]nd because the statute’s text is
plain, we have no power to waive or extend the deadline.” 422

413. Amended Complaint at ¶ 15, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:19-cv23988 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2020).
414. Id. ¶ 16.
415. Gonzalez, 2020 WL 2323032, at *2.
416. Id.
417. Appellant Initial Brief at 13, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-12113
(11th Cir. July 16, 2020) (emphasis added).
418. Id. at 13, 16.
419. Id. at 16.
420. Id. Gonzalez stated the district court did not permit the filing of the Amicus
Brief.
421. Brief of Former Congressmen Dan Burton and Robert Torricelli, supra note
395, at 2.
422. Order at 3, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-12113 (11th Cir. Feb. 11,
2021).
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Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard S.A.

The District Court for the Southern District of Florida also dismissed
the Title III case against Pernod Ricard S.A., a French producer of alcoholic
beverages. 423 Plaintiff Marlene Cueto Iglesias’s father was the owner of
Conac Cueto, C.I.A., a Cuban-based cognac producer and seller.424 Plaintiffs alleged that the Cuban government confiscated “intellectual property,
oak barrels, bottles, labels, corks, tasters, meters, and other assets the Company used in the production and sale of cognac.” 425 Plaintiffs further alleged
that these assets were then merged into the Cuban Government Rum Company, which later partnered with Defendant Pernod Ricard to sell the Cueto
cognac under the brand name “Havana Club.”426 According to plaintiffs,
Pernod Ricard has knowingly and intentionally distributed the Havana Club
line of products worldwide since 1993.427 To do so, it has allegedly used the
assets and intellectual property of the family company without authorization or compensation and has participated and profited from the Cuban
government’s possession of those assets.428
Defendant raised the issue of standing; however, the court found that
plaintiffs do indeed have standing, reasoning that “[l]ike the plaintiff in
Havana Docks, Plaintiffs’ standing here is predicated on their claim that
they hold an interest in the confiscated property that was the subject of
dealings between Defendant and the Cuban Government.”429 The court also
found that plaintiffs sufficiently stated their claim and established the element of scienter.430 In addition to plainly alleging that Pernod Ricard knowingly and intentionally trafficked in the confiscated property at issue, plaintiffs referenced “Cuban newspapers that reported on the Cuban Government’s confiscation of various areas of private property, including rum and
alcohol companies, and . . . contend[ed] that the markings on the seized
property, including barrels and other materials, gave or should have given
Defendant reason to know that the property was owned by Cuban citizens.”431 The court explained that these extra details distinguish plaintiffs’
case from others, where only conclusory allegations of scienter were made,
without more.432
423. Order, Cueto v. Pernod Ricard, No. 1:20-cv-20157 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020).
424. Id. at 1. Miriam Iglesias Alvarez, a family member, was added to the amended
complaint as another plaintiff.
425. Id. at 2.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Order, supra note 423, at 2, 18.
429. Id. at 18.
430. Id. at 19.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 20.
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Despite these wins, the court ultimately dismissed the case, finding
that plaintiffs did not establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction. 433 Because Pernod Ricard is a French corporation organized under
foreign law with a principal place of business in Paris, France, it would
have to possess significant contacts with the State of Florida for the court to
establish general jurisdiction. 434 Plaintiffs argued that the activities of defendant’s subsidiary, Pernod Ricard USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, meet the “substantial and not isolated activity within this state
requirement necessary to satisfy Florida’s long-arm general jurisdiction
statute.”435 According to plaintiffs, those activities are imputed to the defendant because the US subsidiary is an “alter-ego” of defendant.436 To
support their alter-ego claim, plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that
the subsidiary is registered to do business in Florida and that 28 percent of
Pernod Ricard’s overall sales take place in the United States. 437 The court
found that these allegations were insufficient to support plaintiffs’ arguments and explained that under Florida law, “to pierce the corporate veil
under an alter-ego theory, the plaintiff must establish ‘both that the corporation is a “mere instrumentality” or alter ego of the defendant, and that the
defendant engaged in “improper conduct” in the formation or use of the
corporation.’”438 This aside, the court reiterated that the exercise of jurisdiction must also satisfy the Due Process Clause. Under the US Constitution
and Supreme Court precedent, general personal jurisdiction over a corporation exists only “when [its] affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”439 Here,
the court found that Pernod Ricard’s connections with Florida do not meet
the rigor of the test.440
Finally, because plaintiffs failed to identify which sections of the Florida long-arm statute they were relying upon to establish specific personal
jurisdiction, the court was unable to assess whether any of those sections
were applicable to the case. 441 The court, nevertheless, addressed two sec433. Order, supra note 423, at 16.
434. Id. at 9.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 9-10.
438. Order, supra note 423, at 10 (citing WH Smith, PLC v. Benages & Assocs.,
Inc., 51 So. 3d 577, 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)). While at the motion to dismiss stage, a
plaintiff need only allege facts to support a plausible basis for its claim. Here, plaintiffs
failed to allege that “the corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper
purpose; and . . . the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate form caused injury to the
claimant.” Id. at 11.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 13.
441. Id. at 14.
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tions of the long-arm statute that could establish jurisdiction. First, because
plaintiffs contended that specific jurisdiction could be established through
defendant’s US subsidiary, the court considered whether that subsidiary
was “operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business venture
in Florida” that “had a substantial connection to the cause of action in this
case.”442 The court found that “Plaintiffs merely advance the conclusory
assertion of alter ego, while giving only a general description of what business Pernod USA conducts.”443 Without allegations on defendant’s acts
within Florida and more details on the relationship between Pernod Ricard
and the US subsidiary, the court could not find that jurisdiction exists under
this basis.444 Second, the court considered whether defendant committed a
tortious act within the state, but once again found that plaintiffs did not establish jurisdiction under this scenario, because they “failed to allege that
Defendant, or its agent, committed a tortious act in Florida by selling or
distributing the Havana Club.”445 As with its analysis on general jurisdiction, the court made it clear that even if plaintiffs could allege the types of
facts needed to satisfy the long-arm specific jurisdiction statute, any exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the Due Process Clause. 446
The court gave plaintiffs leave to file a motion for jurisdictional discovery and a second amended complaint447 but later denied all three of
plaintiffs’ motions for jurisdictional discovery, finding that “Plaintiffs
failed to inform the Court what discovery they sought or how it would establish personal jurisdiction.”448 In response to plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint, defendant filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 449 which the court granted on June 17, 2021.450 In this second round,
plaintiffs (1) added the allegation that defendant’s US subsidiaries allow
international travelers to purchase Havana Club Cognac duty free at the
442. Order, supra note 423, at 14.
443. Id. at 15.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 15-16. The court provides the three-part test employed by the Eleventh
Circuit to determine whether Due Process is being respected: Consider whether (1) “plaintiffs have established that their claims ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum;” (2) “plaintiffs have demonstrated that defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state;” and (3)
“the defendant has made a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Order, supra note 423, at 16.
447. Id.
448. Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, No. 1:20-cv-20157, 2021 WL 3083063 at *1
(S.D. Fla. June 17, 2021).
449. See Defendant Pernod Ricard S.A.’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(2) and 12(B)(6) and Memorandum of Law in Support, Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, No. 1:20-cv-20157 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2020).
450. Cueto Iglesias, 2021 WL 3083063.

2021]

THE HELMS-BURTON ACT BACKFIRES

75

Miami airport and (2) argued that defendant’s sale of rum to Florida residents through its website is sufficient to establish the minimum contacts
necessary to trigger personal jurisdiction. 451 The court disagreed, stating
that these types of arguments would “render foreign corporations subject to
personal jurisdiction in nearly every major city in the United States where a
consumer has access to an airport and the internet.” 452 Ultimately, the court
found that “Plaintiffs did not add any meaningful substance to their jurisdictional allegations.”453 Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to
the Eleventh Circuit on July 21, 2021, and as of January 7, 2022, the court
has not issued an opinion. 454
F.

A SUMMARY OF LITIGATION TRENDS

The lawsuits brought over the past two years may not have overwhelmed the US judicial system as initially expected; however, they have
been instrumental in revealing the shortcomings of the Helms-Burton Act
and providing analysis to many pertinent provisions for the first time since
it was passed. The sample of cases discussed in this Article have presented
some patterns—both as to the type of defendant being targeted and the contested legal issues facing parties and judges alike.
1.

A Slow Start to Litigation with Unexpected Defendants

In part, the Helms-Burton Act seeks to provide former property owners with a path to recovery, given the absence of formal compensation from
the Cuban government. For this reason, Congress likely contemplated that
the “model” Title III lawsuit would be against Cuban entities or foreign
investors benefiting from expropriated properties once belonging to US
citizens. In fact, in the conference report on the Helms-Burton Act, Representative Livingston, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, stated:
The conference report permits American citizens to
recover damages from foreign investors who are
profiting from their stolen property in Cuba. This
will block the foreign investment lifeline which
keeps Castro’s regime alive.

451.
452.
453.
454.
21, 2021).

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Notice of Appeal, Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, No. 21-12298 (11th Cir. July

76

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42-1

The conference report also creates a right for U.S.
citizens to sue parties that knowingly and intentionally traffic in confiscated property of U.S. nationals. Moreover, it denies entry into the United
States of any such individual. These are logical
steps which will compel international companies
to make a fundamental choice: ignore U.S. property rights and engage in business as usual with Castro or maintain access to the world’s largest market.455
However, the majority of defendants are turning out to be American companies. The trends born from the cases analyzed in this Article help answer
why so few cases have been filed and why so many cases are targeting domestic defendants, who often have very little direct connection to plaintiffs’
expropriated property.
First, Mata v. Expedia, Inc. demonstrates that serving process against
remote foreign entities is time consuming and challenging. 456 This has led
plaintiffs to abandon foreign defendants and pivot toward suing more
reachable American companies, even if their claims of “trafficking” are not
as robust as they could be with a more appropriate defendant. In other cases, plaintiffs are likely making the strategic decision to avoid naming foreign defendants from the start in order to dodge service of process, lack of
jurisdiction, and other procedural hurdles. US courts are unlikely to have
personal jurisdiction over most foreign corporations, which are by their
very nature incorporated abroad. The mere fact that a company might be
commercially active in the United States is likely not enough to bring it
within the purview of US courts.
Next, the Act itself can help explain the low number of cases generated since Title III went into effect. While the pool of potential plaintiffs is
very large, Section 6082(b) requires that the amount of controversy exceed
$50,000, exclusive of interest and other costs, thereby excluding over 85
455. 142 CONG. REC. H1731 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Livingston),
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/1996/3/6/house-section/article/h17244?s=1&r=45 [https://perma.cc/N9MF-GY5P].
456. See supra Section IV.C.3. One notable exception is the case filed by the US
energy conglomerate, Exxon Mobil, against three Cuban state-owned companies. In an
unprecedented move, the Cuban government appeared in US court to defend the lawsuit,
which has tackled the question of whether Title III waives the immunity afforded to sovereign defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The US District Court
for the District of Columbia has held that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception abrogated the Cuban defendants’ sovereign immunity. The district court has certified this issue for
interlocutory review by the D.C. Circuit. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX S.A., No. 19-cv-1277 (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 2021).

2021]

THE HELMS-BURTON ACT BACKFIRES

77

percent of certified claims alone.457 Further, Section 6084 creates a twoyear limitation period, meaning that a lawsuit for “trafficking” may not be
brought more than two years after the trafficking activities have ceased to
occur.458 Other statutory provisions that likely limit the amount of cases
filed revolve around actions that are not considered to be “trafficking.” The
“lawful travel” exception has been a hotly contested exception in multiple
cases, and while Judge James Lawrence King in Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., and Judge Bloom in the Havana Docks cases, both issued the
significant procedural ruling that the lawful travel clause is an affirmative
defense,459 plaintiffs may be hesitant to bring actions if their case might be
dismissed in later stages of litigation due to this exception. The Act also
provides that the delivery of international telecommunication signals to
Cuba, the trading or holding of publicly traded or held securities, and any
transaction or use of property by a person who is both a Cuban national and
a resident of Cuba are activities that are not “trafficking.”460
Political realities surrounding the Act could also explain the low number of cases. Canada, Mexico, and the EU have responded to the passage of
the Helms-Burton Act by enacting “blocking statutes,” which are meant to
deter Title III lawsuits.461 These statutes nullify the effect of foreign court
rulings. 462 They also often provide a “claw-back” right of action, which
allows affected entities to recover damages incurred as a result of one’s
compliance with the foreign ruling. 463 The EU specifically announced in its
February 2019 declaration that it would rely on its blocking statute to counteract any effects on EU entities from the full activation of the HelmsBurton Act. 464 The EU Blocking Statute—European Commission (EC)
Regulation 2271/96—requires “EU operators” to notify the EC of any Title
III claim asserted against them. 465 In fact, named defendants cannot respond
to a Title III complaint without express authorization from the EC.466 In
457. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(b) (1996). 5,095 of the 5,911 claims from the first Cuban
Claims Program are valued at less than $50,000. See Final Report of the Commission’s First
Cuba Claims Program, supra note 169.
458. 22 U.S.C. § 6084.
459. See supra Section IV.C.1 and IV.C.2.
460. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B).
461. See, e.g., Blocking Statute, EUR. COMM’N., https://ec.europa.eu/info/businesseconomy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/blocking-statute_en
[https://perma.cc/23HY-KK7G].
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. See supra Section IV.B.
465.
Guidance Note — Questions and Answers: Adoption of Update of the Blocking
Statute,
EUR-LEX,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.CI.2018.277.01.0004.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2018:277I:TOC
[https://perma.cc/977F-QLGX].
466. Id.
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Canto Marti v. Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos, S.L., for example, the
defendant (a Spanish hotel and resort company) filed a motion to stay the
proceeding while it seeks the EC’s authorization to defend the claim. 467
Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr., from the Southern District of Florida, denied
plaintiff’s motion to vacate the stay reasoning that: (1) Iberostar’s violation
of the blocking statute could expose it to fines up to EUR 600,000.00,
which are imposed by the Spanish government; (2) concerns of international comity weigh in favor of the court maintaining the stay; (3) a consideration of the fairness to the litigants warrants continuing the stay; (4) the stay
does not inefficiently use judicial resources; and (5) the stay is not immoderate or indefinite, as there is evidence that the EC is actively considering
Iberostar’s application for authorization. 468 As of January 7, 2022, Iberostar
is still waiting for a decision from the EC on its application for authorization to respond to the complaint.469 Pursuant to a court order, Iberostar continues to file a status report every month to keep the court updated of any
developments associated with the authorization request.470 Given this hurdle, it is possible that some individuals and companies are thinking twice
before filing a Title III lawsuit, which may be delayed by blocking statutes,
and in which they ultimately may never recover damages even if they do
prevail in US courts.
Practical limitations are also deterring potential plaintiffs from filing
lawsuits. Title III actions are guaranteed to be expensive from the very start,
as there is a special filing fee of $6,800, in addition to the typical $350 filing fee imposed for instituting any civil action in district court.471 Additionally, many claimants, particularly Cuban-Americans who were not US citizens at the time of the expropriations, could not get their claims certified by
the FCSC. In the absence of a certification, plaintiffs need to prove that
they have ownership of an actionable claim. Over half a century after the
expropriations, obtaining paperwork that might have been destroyed or lost
during the 1959 revolution to prove property ownership may be a considerable obstacle for some. Evidence of inheritance is not always easy to prove
either, as is demonstrated by Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., where
the question of valid inheritance led to the submission of over five hundred
467. Canto Marti v. Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos, S.L., No. 1:20-cv-20078,
2020 WL 5573265 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2020). Plaintiff Maria Dolores Canto Marti filed the
suit on January 8, 2020. Id. at *1.
468. Id. at *2-3.
469. For defendant’s most recent status report as of December 2021, see Defendant’s
Status Report, Canto Marti v. Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos, S.L., No. 1:20-cv-20078
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2021).
470. Id.
471. District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. COURTS (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cc/JB4D-73CU].
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pages of evidence and required a study of Costa Rican law. 472 Some potential plaintiffs may not even know who to sue, and years of travel restrictions
to Cuba have not made ascertaining defendants easy. While Cuba has loosened its economic and political restrictions and now permits foreign investment, the Cuban State is still a socialist state that exclusively controls
the majority of its economic sectors. Thus, the majority of claimants would
likely have to go up against Cuban-state owned companies in a HelmsBurton Act suit and not an average corporate defendant. An American attorney attempting to represent a plaintiff seeking to sue the Cuban government would need to have a contact within Cuba for such an objective. The
private practice of law is illegal in Cuba, and Cuban attorneys are state attorneys.473 Finding an investigator or other qualified individual in Cuba to
assist with any number of discovery tasks is an additional burden to already
complicated proceedings. Finally, another important consideration is that
there are likely many potential plaintiffs and attorneys who are unwilling to
file high-cost suits in the face of low-stake claims or to sue corporations
with whom they do business or with whom they hope to do business one
day.
2.

Initial Judicial Interpretations of Contested Legal Issues

From the fourteen cases that have been analyzed in this Article, thirteen have produced substantive court rulings on reoccurring legal issues,
solely based on the pleadings.474 Six judges (Judges Beth Bloom, Robert N.
Scola, Jr., Kathleen M. Williams, James Lawrence King, John McBryde,
and Leonard P. Stark) from three federal districts (US District Courts for
the Southern District of Florida, the Northern District of Texas, and the
District of Delaware) have delivered opinions—some of which are conflicting—regarding key issues such as personal jurisdiction, Article III standing,
scienter, and the application of Section 6082(a)(4)(B) to the inheritance of
claims.475
On February 11, 2021, the first appellate opinion for a Title III lawsuit
was issued when the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Southern District of
472. See supra Section IV.C.2.
473.
Victor Li, A New Dawn for Cuba as it Opens for Business, ABA J. (June 1,
2016, 12:10 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a new dawn for Cuba as it
opens for business [https://perma.cc/762K-ZDQP].
474. These cases are the four Havana Docks cases, the three Garcia-Bengochea
cases, Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, the three Glen cases, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com Inc., and
Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard. Mata v. Expedia, Inc. is the only case to have been closed
administratively before producing an opinion on defendant’s arguments in their motion to
dismiss.
475. Each individual holding is discussed in detail, supra Section IV. C., D., and E.
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Florida’s decision to dismiss Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc.476 A few
months later, the Fifth Circuit also issued a judgment for a Title III defendant in Glen v. American Airlines, Inc. Subsequently, Glen became the first
person to petition the US Supreme Court to review the appellate decision,
which would be a case of first impression for the Court.477 Six additional
opinions have been appealed in the Eleventh and Third Circuit Courts. 478
After facing the uncertainty of a law that has never been tested in US
courts, parties are finally receiving some guidance on key issues that can
make or break a Title III action.
Judge Scola in Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH and Judge Williams in
Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard both found that, based on plaintiffs’ allegations, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 479 The key
takeaway from the decisions is that to establish personal jurisdiction (the
court’s power to rule over a specific defendant), plaintiffs must demonstrate
a fairly significant connection between the defendant and the forum state or
show that the suit arises from defendant’s specific activities in the forum
state. To avoid dismissal on this ground, plaintiffs seeking to file Title III
lawsuits should be cognizant of the minimum contacts a defendant must
possess with the forum when drafting their complaints. The facts presented
by the plaintiffs in Del Valle—such as defendant’s maintenance of a website accessible in Florida—fell “woefully short” of the allegations needed to
establish “substantial and not isolated activity” in the forum. 480 In Cueto
Iglesias, the issue was of a different sort—plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to permit the judge to attribute Pernod USA’s activities to the
parent company, which is a foreign corporation and the named defendant. 481
The judges in Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, the Havana Docks cases, and Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC along
with Glen v. Visa Inc., each reached different conclusions on the issue of
Article III standing. Judge McBryde from the Northern District of Texas
held that Plaintiff Glen did not have standing to sue American Airlines,
because he was not harmed by the airline merely engaging in business with
the hotels now built upon what was once his family’s property. Glen’s attempt to argue that the Supreme Court has previously recognized that plain476. See supra Section IV.E.1.
477. See supra Section IV.D.3.
478. As of January 7, 2022, Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., GarciaBengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, and Cueto Iglesias
v. Pernod Ricard are being appealed in the Eleventh Circuit. Garcia-Bengochea’s appeals
have been consolidated by the court. Glen v. TripAdvisor LLC and Glen v. Visa Inc. are
being appealed in the Third Circuit.
479. See supra Section IV.C.4. and IV.E.2.
480. See supra Section IV.C.4.; Del Valle, 2020 WL 2733729, at *2-3.
481. See supra Section IV.E.2.; Order, supra note 423, at 10.
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tiffs may sue to enforce a congressionally created substantive legal right
without establishing additional harm was rejected by the court.482 The Fifth
Circuit, however, reversed the district court’s decision on this point, holding that Glen had alleged an injury that was traceable to American Airlines—that they were trafficking in his properties without compensation or
his authorization. 483 In Cueto Iglesias, Judge Williams from the Southern
District of Florida reached the opposite conclusion from Judge McBryde,
holding that the allegations of profits obtained by defendant from its use of
the expropriated property without providing compensation to the original
owner does constitute sufficient concrete harm. 484 Judge Bloom, also from
the Southern District of Florida, similarly found that plaintiffs have standing to sue in Havana Docks, because “trafficking” in confiscated property is
a violation of plaintiff’s property interest. 485 Focusing on the causation element of standing, Judge Bloom reasoned that, according to Congress, there
exists a chain of causation between plaintiff’s injury initially inflicted by
the Cuban government and the subsequent unjust enrichment of the trafficker.486 Lastly, Judge Stark from the District of Delaware found that Glen
met the standing requirements in both TripAdvisor LLC and Visa Inc. because the trafficking constituted a concrete harm, and because Congress did
not intend for the casual link to stop at the Cuban government’s confiscation. 487 While these holdings are useful, additional appellate court decisions
are needed to provide a clear interpretation on when standing may or may
not be present in Title III cases. For example, one straightforward question
that still needs to be clearly answered is whether plaintiffs always have
standing to sue if they have properly alleged “trafficking.”
Another important issue that has been subject to conflicting rulings is
the element of scienter. Under Title III, for a defendant to be liable for
“trafficking,” he must have knowingly and intentionally engaged in the
conduct described in the Act. The term “knowingly” is further defined by
the Act as “with knowledge or having reason to know.”488 Judge McBryde
in Glen v. American Airlines, Inc. held that to commit trafficking under
Title III, one must know that the property at issue was confiscated and intend that it be the “subject of their commercial behavior.”489 It is not
enough for a defendant to only know and intend to engage in a commercial
482. See supra Section IV.D.3.; Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *3.
483. See supra Section IV.D.3.; Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 336.
484. See supra Section IV.E.2.; Order, supra note 423, at 18.
485. See supra Section IV.C.1.; Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp.
3d. at 1227-28.
486. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d. at 1229-30.
487. See supra Section IV.D. 2.; Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 13.
488. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(9)(A) (1996).
489. See supra Section IV.D.3.; Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *6.
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activity defined as “trafficking” under Title III. 490 The court also rejected
the argument that American Airlines must have known that the property at
issue was confiscated, because the Act includes a finding that the Cuban
government confiscated virtually all privately owned real property. 491 The
court reasoned that this position is flawed, since Congress clearly felt the
need to add the word “knowingly” into the Act and to further define it despite this finding.492 Knowledge aside, the court also pointed out that Glen
failed to allege any facts to show American Airlines had acted intentionally.493 In Glen’s other two cases, Judge Stark similarly held that a defendant
must know that the properties at issue were confiscated, and having reason
to know, given the historical and political context, is insufficient. 494 Judge
Stark also discussed the status of scienter during the post-notice period—
that is, after a plaintiff delivers the “cease and desist” notice to a defendant
indicating its intent to initiate an action. The Visa entities were the only
defendants to stop their commercial activities with the hotels following the
notice; accordingly, Judge Stark found that Glen had “plausibly alleged
scienter against all Defendants other than Visa, at least of the post-notice
period.”495 Judge Scola in Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc. also held that
plaintiff failed to allege scienter because it only offered conclusory allegations without presenting any additional facts that could demonstrate defendant’s knowledge of trafficking. 496 Judge Williams in Cueto Iglesias
issued the opposite holding, reasoning that the allegations presented by
plaintiffs were distinguishable from those presented in Gonzalez.497 By adding a few factual allegations to the complaint, such as references to Cuban
news articles detailing the government’s expropriation of alcohol companies, plaintiffs in Cueto Iglesias were able to establish scienter, at least at
the pleading stage.498 Lastly, Judge King in Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holds Ltd., presents an entirely different holding on this
issue—plaintiffs only need to allege scienter in general terms, and no specific facts showing defendant’s state of mind at the time of the “trafficking”
need to be included in the pleadings. 499
Ultimately, the judges in these cases appear to agree that “trafficking”
requires a defendant to knowingly and intentionally interact with the con490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section IV.D. 2.; Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 20-21.
Memorandum Op., supra note 359, at 22.
See supra Section IV.E.1.; Gonzalez, 2020 WL 1169125, at *2.
See supra Section IV.E.2.; Order, supra note 423, at 20.
Order, supra note 423, at 19.
See supra Section IV.C.2.; Garcia-Bengochea, 2020 WL 5028209, at *4.
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fiscated property in a manner provided for in the Act. Where the opinions
diverge is, how specific a showing of scienter must be. Garcia-Bengochea
held that a plaintiff does not need to allege specific facts to show a defendant’s state of mind—an allegation that defendant trafficked in confiscated
property with the requisite state of mind is sufficient. Cueto Iglesias required greater specificity and held that a plaintiff must allege facts to show
that a defendant knows or has reason to know that the property it is dealing
with was confiscated. Gonzalez and American Airlines both held that plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate defendant’s knowledge. 500 American
Airlines went a step further, holding that “[m]erely having reason to know
is insufficient to satisfy § 6023(13)(A)’s scienter requirement,” and reminding plaintiffs that “Congress chose to include the intent requirement, and
the court should not ignore it.”501 Thus, from all the opinions addressing the
issue, American Airlines appears to have imposed the most rigorous standard for satisfying the Act’s scienter requirement.
The final major issue that courts have produced opinions on is what it
means for a plaintiff to have “acquired” their claim before the statutory cutoff date of March 12, 1996. The plaintiffs in Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival
Corp., Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., and the three Glen cases each inherited their claim after March 12, 1996, so defendants argued that plaintiffs are
barred from bringing an action.502 In response, plaintiffs assert that the term
“acquire” does not pertain to scenarios of inheritance. The courts, however,
have all disagreed, holding that the provision requiring a plaintiff to have
acquired their claim before March 12, 1996 is broad enough to include acquisition by inheritance.503 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits both upheld this
interpretation in American Airlines and Gonzalez.
Besides this important holding, the district court opinions make clear
that it is vital for plaintiffs to allege facts regarding the date of confiscation
and the date of acquiring the property or claim so that the court can evaluate
the positions properly. For example, the court in Gonzalez found in its
March 2020 Order that Gonzalez’s complaint lacked allegations regarding
critical facts surrounding the line of inheritance and the family’s citizenship
status, leading to its conclusion that “[w]ithout these allegations, Gonzalez
500. In holding that the Act requires that “a person must know that the property was
confiscated by the Cuban government and intend that such property be the subject of their
commercial behavior,” the Glen court states that it is “not alone in its interpretation of the
breadth of the scienter element,” referencing the decision in Gonzalez, 2020 WL 1169125.
Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665 at *6.
501. Id. The court did not specify how a plaintiff can show a defendant’s intent.
502. See supra Section IV.C.2., IV.D., and IV.E.1.
503. Id.; Garcia-Bengochea, 2020 WL 4590825, at *4; Am. Airlines, 2020 WL
4464665, at *4; Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 336; Gonzalez, 2020 WL 2323032, at *2; Order,
supra note 422. The defendants in Del Valle also made this argument, but it was not addressed by the district court’s opinion. See supra Section IV.C.4.
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has not sufficiently alleged that he has an actionable ownership interest in
the confiscated property.”504
V. CONCLUSION
US policy toward Cuba has been defined for far too long by conflicts
of the past. Promoting democratic values and obtaining compensation for
US nationals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government
are important national priorities; however, it is clear that the Helms-Burton
Act has not been effective in achieving either. Instead of advancing democratic change in Cuba, the Act has merely entrenched anti-US attitudes
among Cubans and angered our allies. In reality, most of the United States’
justifications for the statute’s promulgation are disingenuous. It was never
purely about protection of private property rights. For years, the United
States refused to initiate diplomatic relations with Cuba, preventing any
negotiation on claims settlements. Representing the Libertad Act as a reaction to Cuba’s violation of political and human rights also holds minimal
weight, as the United States has maintained close trade (and at times diplomatic) ties with countries like China, Vietnam, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and
India, which have been also widely criticized for human rights abuses. 505
This legislation is more accurately described as an attempt to exert economic pressure and drive foreign investment out of the communist island nation.
In its efforts to do so, the Act violates fundamental principles of international law, casts great doubt on the effectiveness of US diplomacy, and has
most recently resulted in the unanticipated targeting of American companies in Title III litigation. For these reasons, the new Biden Administration
should consider restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba and implore Congress to repeal the Helms-Burton Act. As the United States has done in the
past with the Soviet Union, China, Germany, and Vietnam (for example), it
should focus on negotiating a settlement agreement with the Cuban government. 506 Failure to restore these ties and ease deep-rooted bilateral tensions will mean that Title III plaintiffs will continue to struggle with what
appear to be unsustainable lawsuits, domestic companies will be forced to
defend even more “trafficking” claims, and the United States will remain
tied to the diplomatic challenges it created for itself over half a century ago.
504.
505.

Gonzalez, 2020 WL 1169125 at *2 (citation omitted).
For US trade statistics, see Countries & Regions, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions [https://perma.cc/TP73-FJEX]. China is
the United States’ 3rd largest goods trading partner, India is the 9th largest, Vietnam is the
13th largest, Thailand is the 20th largest, and Saudi Arabia is the 27th largest trading partner.
Id. All of these nations are known for their poor human rights records. See e.g., Countries,
HUMAN RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/countries [https://perma.cc/V36Q-273L].
506. FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 26-27.
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